

Incident Ref#	Date and Time	C/S, Reg, Squawk	Base Aerodrome	Position of infringement	ATC Action	Follow up Action
1	18/07/14 1248			R156, NE triangle (N of Blackwater)	NIL. Blind Calls	
2	18/07/2014 1254			S of Laindon A1000 indicated. ACFT contacted London info S of LCY and transferred to us.	NIL. Blind Calls	Stap contacted I/B continent. Gazelle. EGSG-EBKT
3	18/07/14 1458			230 DEG 9.5NM 4.0 descending 2.4	Phoned Thames, A/C left CAS by descent for EG SX	Thames transferred A/C to EGLF. ATCO apologised as he forgot about RMZ and not selected on Radar Map.
4	18/07/2014 1656			235 DEG 10NM maneuvered at 5NM and left at entry position	RVR7BD made visual contact and believed it to be a R22/R44	Traced back and have asked them to call us.
5	19/07/2014 1147-1115			10NM W Eastbound	Blind calls.	Spoke to pilot and educated RMZ
6	19/07/14 1206			Medway 10NM SW	Blind calls. Once in Zone Pilot called and was educated on RMZ	N/A
7	19/07/14 1533			10NM W	Called LF Pilot had called already in RMZ	N/A
8	20/07/14 1300			5N (climbed to 4.4)	NIL	Phoned EG SX will educate pilot
9	20/07/14 1657			Stow and 5NM W abeam SW bound	NIL	Observed ACFT. Went to LF and asked them to remind pilot
10	21/07/2014 1030			2NM SW - SE bound	NIL	London Info asked to remind pilot of RMZ
11	21/07/14 1510			East Tip of Osea	Blind Call	Friendly exchange about RMZ dimensions
12	22/07/2014 1154			270° 10nm tracking 050°	Blind Calls, (Wattisham reminded pilot or RMZ)	
13	22/07/2014 1449			250° 11nm tracking LAM-DVR	Phoned EGLF who queried we wanted to work it	
14	22/07/14 1619			075 DEG 13NM TO 075 DEG 9NM	Blind calls (subsequently found to have hexcode)	U/K infringer appeared to be landing/operating (unreadable)
15	22/07/14 1622			025 DEG 11NM	Blind calls	EGSR contacted and asked pilot to contact us
16	23/07/14 1144,1243,1318			234 DEG 7.5NM, 213 DEG 10NM, 200 DEG 10NM	Blind calls	Advised of RMZ
17	24/07/ 1610			208 DEG 10NM Entered RMZ by 2NM and O/F Stoke	Blind call - no response	
18	24/07/14			2 or 3 acft called inside RMZ S of Stowe to transit S bound (N/T)	None as A/C departed quickly	

19	24/07/14 1806				Blind calls	A/C observed coasting out EGMH
20	25/07/14 0603			225 DEG 11NM	Blind calls no response	Acft contacted Essex radar North of rmz. Essex asked to tell Pilot
21	25/07/14 0845			255 DEG 10NM	Blind calls no response	acft contacted london info whilst in RMZ to activate FPL. London info called to put ACFT over
22	25/07/14 1120			Osea Island EGUW/LFAC (English pilot)	LFIR contacted to put acft over	
23	25/07/14 1347			9 SW	Blind calls	
24	26/07/14 0912			272 DEG 10.6 FM EGMC	Called FIR as on #1177	
25	26/07/14 1110			W of Osea but then turned away	Blind calls no response	
26	26/07/14 1415			E of EGMT to SWF	Blind calls no response	
27	27/07/14 0932			W of Bradwell	Blind calls	
28	27/07/2014 1039			E 108 DEG 8NM N BOUND	Blind calls	
29	27/07/14 1133			SW 197 DEG 10NM NW bound	Blind calls	
30	28/07/14 1232			11NM 258 DEG HDG 055	Blind calls	Called UW.
31	29/07/14 0826			E of EGMT SE bound	Blind calls/Called FIR	Pilot observed # called FIR and transferred. Pilot called and was opr Brentwood and declared fully aware of RMZ! Told to call SEN in future
32	30/07/14			Bradwell Bay west along Blackwater	None	Aircraft went off Radar
33	30/07/14			10NM WEST TO 6NM SOUTH	None	
34	31/07/14			Kingsnorth power station, manouvered for 3 mins, then left via Kingsnorth	None	Lost contact South of Sheppy
35	31/07/14 0934			ABEAM EGMT SE BOUND	CALLED LONDON INFO TOOK A WHILE TO ANSWER, EASYJET TURNED OFF NOISE	Pilot educated
36	02/08/14			8SW TO/SL	NONE	ESTABLISHED CONTACT 8SW. PILOT EDUCATED.
37	02/08/14			SSE STOWMARIES TRACKING NE	BLIND TX	LEFT RMZ OVERHEAD BRADWELL. DISSAPPEARED FROM RADAR OVERHEAD SQ, CALLED SQ.THEY SAID NO ONE INBOUND
38	03/08/14			BARLING	ASKED TO CALL ATC	DID NOT CALL PRIOR TO DEP BECAUSE OF UAVS FLYING?
39	03/08/14			9 MILES SW	BLIND TX - ACFT WAS LISENING	REMINDER OF RMZ + REQUIREMENT TO ESTABLISH 2 WAY
40	05/08/14			1 1/2 M INSIDE SW RMZ	A/C CALLED UP	NONE - FREQ QUITE BUSY

41	07/08/14			10 SW IOG	BLIND TX	
42	07/08/14			ISLE OF GRAIN	BLIND TX (RETURN TRIP)	
43	09/08/14			200DEG 9NM	NONE	NONE
44	09/08/14			ENTERED AT 270DEG 10NM SE BOUND LEFT AT 200 DEG 11NM	NONE	NONE
45	09/08/14			ENTERED AT EAST TILBURY, LEFT AT CHATHAM, 1 MILE INSIDE CONTINUOUS	RANG EGTO	THEY WILL REMIND
46	11/08/14			OESY TO SABER	RANG FIR	
47	12/08/14 1245			ST MARYS MARSH NE BOUND TOWARD EGMT		CONTACT LOST AT EGMT. OTHER A/C IN VICINITY OBSERVED CONTACT AS C152 APPROX 1.6
48	13/08/14 1358			10 MILES SW OF MC VACATED ABEAM STOKE		MODE S APPEARED IN VICINITY OF STOKE
49	13/08/14 1358			HFD TO BASILDON	NEEDED CLIMB FOR REA OR AVOIDING ACTION WOULD HAVE BEEN PASSED	
50	15/08/14			MEDWAY NW BOUND	N/A	ACFT CALLED BUT COULD NOT HEAR TX 2 WAY NOT EST. BUT ACFT STILL WENT THROUGH RMZ
51	15/08/14			2NM SE HFD	BLIND CALLS. ALMOST HAD TO BREAK EZY OFF APP	- STL RADIO TO EDUCATE PILOT
52	15/08/14			2NM W OF STOKE	N/A	NONE
53	15/08/14			1.5NM SW STOKE	ACFT CALLED WHEN IN RMZ STOKE- WILINGALE	
54	15/08/14			1NM EAST D146 MANAOUVERING JUST INSIDE		
55	15/08/14			6NM SW SLOW MOVING. EZY INBOUND	NA	NA
56	15/08/14			8NMW EGSU INBOUND	N/A	N/A
57	16/08/14			ENTERED LAINDON O/H CANVEY. LEFT RMZ SHEERNESS	BLIND CALLS. NO CONTACT	
58	16/08/14			SHEERNESS-LAINDON- STRAIGHT THROUGH MIDDLE	BLIND CALLS	N/A
59	17/08/14			10NM SW NORTHBOUND WORKING LONDON INFO	PHONED LONDON INFO REQUESTING TRANSFER AND REMINDER OF RMZ	
60	17/08/14			10NM EAST	N/A	NONE
61	18/08/14			SW 10NM	BLIND CALL	
62	18/08/14			082 9.2NM	BLIND CALLS	TRACKED DISSAPEARED @ABBOT
63	19/08/14			SW 25SDEG	BLIND CALLS (MODE S)	INFORMED HIM OF RMZ WITH EARLIER CALL REQUIRED (INBOUND)
64	19/08/14				BLIND CALL NO RESPONSE	CARRIER WAVE ONLY
65	20/08/14			STOKE TO BASILDON	NONE	NONE
66	21/08/14			NE CORNER BRADWELL BAY	BLIND CALL	NONE
67	21/08/14			8NM WEST	NONE	NONE
68	21/08/14			10NM WEST	CALLED EGLF	TRAFFIC TRANSFERRED OVER
69	22/08/14			KINGSNORTH TRACKING 330	SEVERAL BLIND CALLS	
70	23/08/14			10NM WEST	EGLF TRANSFER	TRANSFERRED ONCE IN RMZ
71	23/08/14			222 DEG 10.5NM	AVOIDING ACTION GIVEN DEPARTURE	PHONECALL TO
72	23/08/14			240 DEG 10.5NMEXITED KINGSNORTH	BLIND CALLS	TRACKED TO DET AREA POSSIBLE DISPLAY AT SHOW
73	23/08/14			210 10.5NM INDICATING 2.0	BLIND CALLS	INBOUND EGSX. PILOT ASKED TO PHONE AFTER LANDING . EXPERIENCED FLYER
74	24/08/14			250 10.5NM 2.3A	BLIND CALLS	VACATED 180 DEG 7.4NM
75	24/08/14 1106			225 DEG 10.5NM 2.3 EASTBOUND	PHONED EGKB TRANSFERRED A/C	A/C CALLED 1109
76	24/08/14 1156			10 SW ENTERED FOR 3 MINS	BLIND TX	APPEARED TO GO INTO EGTO TOO BUSY TO TRACE
77	24/08/14 1421			2NM N CANVEY SW BOUND	BLIND TX	LAST OBSERVED 4NM EAST EGKB. EGKB CALLED AND OBSERVED POSSIBLE VINTAGE AIRCRAFT

78	24/08/14 1620			10.5 BEARING 250 TURNED W OF CANVEY AND LEFT RMZ TO WEST	BLIND TX	
79	24/08/14 1657			2NM E OF MT. CUT CORNER NORTHBOUND	BLIND TX	
80	24/08/14 1709			BRASO	BLIND TX. EST CONTACT	PILOT APOLOGISED
81	27/08/14			FIRST CALL CORRINGHAM LOW LEVEL EASTBOUND (NO RADAR CONTACT)	AFTER HANDOVER ASKED PILOT IF IT WAS FIRST CALL HE SAID NO	ON QUESTIONING OTHER CONTROLLER A/C HAD LEFT FREQUENCY TO WEST EARLIER SO HAD ENTERED RMZ AGAIN NOT 2 WAY.
82	27/08/14 1113Z			FROM STOKE ALONG COAST JUST TO SOUTH OF KINGSNORTH SW BOUND	NONE	
83	27/08/14 1141			AS ABOVE	NONE	
84	27/08/14 1256			2NM EAST OF LAINDON	NONE	
85	28/08/14			NORTHEY IS THEN S OF OSEA EAST. MANOURED 8NM FINAL RWY 24 BEFORE TRACKING NORTH BOUND	BLIND TX NO RESPONSE	TRACKED BACK TO LAND EGRS. PILOT ASKED TO PHONE US AND THEN BRIEFED ON PRESENCE OF RMZ THAT HE DID NOT KNOW ABOUT.
86	29/08/14			9 SW	AT/C WORKING EGLF	CALLED EGLF
87	29/08/14			N OF MEDWAY	AS ABOVE	
88	29/08/14			STOKE CLIMBING 4W SEN	BLIND TX	
89	29/08/14 1240			8NM NE ABEAM BRADWELL 2.5A	CALLED LONDON INFO TO ARRANGE H/O	CONTACTED 6NE SEN. PILOT WAS EDUCATED BY RAD.
90	29/08/14 1520			5NM TO HANN	ED TO EGBK	TX BY FIR AT 1520 TO CALL SND. DID NOT CALL
91	30/08/14 1212			POP-UP OVER CANVEY TRACKING SOUTH	BLIND CALL NO RESPONSE	
92	30/08/2014			STOKE	UP TO 15 BLIND CALLS. ALREADY 2 WAY AT EGUB BUT LAST CONTACT DELAYED DEP A319	EST 2 WAY ONCE OUTSIDE RMZ
93	31/08/14 1050			270 DEG 10.5NM TRACKING SE	RAD CONTACTED EGLF AND ASKED TO TRANSFER STRAIGHT TO DIRECTOR	LYD PDR RWY 24 DELAYED BY 1 MINUTE AND THEN AMENDED CLEARANCE GIVEN ONCE IN CONTACT. PILOT REMINDED OF RMZ AND TO CALL EGMC NOT EGLF ON THAT ROUTE.
94	31/08/14 1241			245 DEG 5NM SE BOUND	NONE	FAST MOVING PSR CONTACT APPEARED OVER CANVEY SE BOUND LOST CONTACT ON THE MEDWAY.
95	31/08/14 1507			161 DEG 6.3NM NW BOUND	NONE	A/C CONTACTED EGLF WHILST IN RMZ (SPOKE TO EGLF TO REMIND PILOT)
96	31/08/14 1509			330 DEG 5.5NM	NONE. OUT OF STOW. DID NOT REMAIN OUTSIDE WHILST GETTING CALL IN.	
97	31/08/14 1715				PILOT DID NOT CALL UNTIL 4 MILES INTO RMZ. EGLF PHONED, HAD JUST TRANSFERRED THEM (WENT TO # AT RMZ BOUNDARY)	PILOT REMINDED OF NEED TO CALL.
98	02/09/14 1045			0.5 MILE N OF WICKFORD ENTER TRACKING S PASSING THROUGH 7 MILE FINAL RWY 06 (IN USE) LEFT RMZ IN KINGSNORTH POWERSTATION. IN RMZ APPROX 10 MINS	REPORTED PRIMARY CONTACT AS MICROLIGHT, GAVE TRAFFIC INFO TO ON TS	LOST CONTACT EAST ABEAM DET ROUTING SOUTH
99	02/09/14 1154			OSEA ISLAND SOUTHBOUND ORBITTED 800FT	BLIND CALL TO A/C WHO RESPONDED AND PASSED DETAILS	NO SERVICE REQUESTED AND EXPRESSED REMAINING NORTH OF OSEA AFTER INITIAL MANOEUVRE
100	02/09/2014 1434			2SW STOKE	BELIEVED TO BE A/C OPR OUT OF STOKE	
101	03/09/14 1202			317 DEG WICKFORD 6.1NM	BLIND CALLS MADE NO REPLY. NO EFFECT APART FRM INCREASED WORKLOAD TRACING	PSR TRACKED, APPEARED TO LAND EGML. PILOT ASKED TO CONTACT US BY PHONE. HE DID AND APOLOGISED.

102	03/09/14 1423			10NM W CUT CORNER	BLIND TX BASED ON MODE S. PILOT APPOLOGISED THOUGHT HE WAS OUTSIDE	PILOT EDUCATED ON R/T NO FURTHER ACTION
103	03/09/14 1540			SW OF LFZ BY 0.5 DME INSIDE RMZ	MONITORED AND RECORDED	APPEARED TO BE (UNREADABLE) TRAFFIC
104	03/09/1 1549			240 DEG 9 DME INSIDE	NO CONTACT UNABLE TO TRACE	LEFT RMZ AT 1550 POSSIBLY INSIDE FRM LAINDON
105	03/09/14 1448			DEP EGTO TO 5NM THEN WEST TO LEAVE	TRACED TO EGTO. CALLED EGTO	PILOT HAD UNDERCARRIAGE ISSUES REALISED INSIDE AND RETURNED TO EGTO. PILOT CALLED BY PHONE.
106	03/09/14 1615			205 DEG 4.5 DME MID THAMES		NOTHING AFFECTED. UNABLE TO TRACE -
107	03/09/2014			FLY IN. NO NOTIFICATION		
108	04/09/2014			SE THROUGH CENTRELINE 8NM NW BOUND	NO ACTION	LOST CONTACT NW EGSG
109	06/09/2014			255 DEG 10.6NM HDG SE	BLIND TX	NONE
110	07/09/14 1351			BRADWELL BAY THEN W ABEAM BLACKWATER		UNABLE TO TRACE (STOW MARIES FLY IN TODAY)
111	07/09/14 1402			J20 106 DEG DME SW OF STOW	RADAR TOO BUSY TO BLIND TX	
112	08/09/14 1040			ENTERED @ KINGSNORTH BOX AREA TRACKING N	CALLS MADE TO A/C. CALLED 1 MILE INSIDE	
113	08/09/14 1140			DUE SOUTH OF STOW MARIES W BOUND ALONG CROUCH.	BLIND TX	UNABLE TO TRACE (FLY IN TODAY)
114	08/09/14 1240			ENTERED AT STOW TRACKING S LEFT W ABEAM KINGSNORTH		. C172. (UNREADABLE)
115	08/09/14 1350			LEFT CAS (THAMES) 12NM NE TRACKING WEST THAMES TO EGLF		
116	08/09/14 1543			ENTERED RMZ 270 DEG 10NM SBOUND	BLIND CALLS. REDUCED SEPARATION AGREED AVOIDING GIVEN FOR A SHORT FINAL	LOST CONTACT CROSSING NORTH THAMES TRACKING S BOUND
117	08/09/14 1643			R156 A2.2	BLIND CALLS	VECTORED STK SLIGHTLY FURTHER SOUTH
118	08/09/14 1649			STOW A1	THOUGHT IT WAS INTO STOW. CALLED ME. (UNREADABLE)	
119	08/09/14 1659			JUST WEST OF STOKE	POSSIBLY JUST WONDERED TOO FAR FROM STOKE	
120	09/09/2014			5NM	BLIND CALL	CALLED US INSIDE FOR REJOIN
121	10/09/2014			210 DEG 11 DME 5NM	BLIND CALL	WAS LISTENING. IDENT AND PROVIDED BS WITH ADVISE ON RMZ
122	10/09/2014			260 DEG 10.5NM HDG SE	LONDON FIR CONTACTED BUT TOOK 2 MINUTES TO ANSWER PHONE! THEN TRANSFERRED ACFT TO RADAR WHEN OVER ST MARY'S MARSH.	
123	10/09/2014			INDICATING 1100 (UNREADABLE)	EGLF CONTACTED AND PUT OVER	PILOT CONTACTED (UNREADABLE) DID NOT HAVE (UNREADABLE) TO DIAL SOUTHEND FREQUENCY (TO EGLF)
124	10/09/2014			OASY	BLIND CALLS	TRACKING
125	10/09/2014			5NM NW BOUND	BLIND CALL	HE CALLED EGLF
126	10/09/2014			5NM TRACKING EDGE OF RMZ SOUTHBOUND. WENT INTO STOKE.		
127	11/09/14 1218			7NM S TRACKING NW	BLIND CALLS	CALLED ON FREQ N OF STOKE HAD PROBLEMS LEAVING FIR FQ
128	11/09/2014 1230			329 AT 5.8 NM SSW BOUND	BLIND CALL	
129	12/09/2014				CALLED AT 0933 REPLIED AT 0935. A/C WAS IN RMZ BY 2 MILES ORBITING HAVING DEP FRM STOKE	IDENT AND GIVEN BS
130	12/09/2014			260 DEG 10.5NM SE BOUND 1900FT	A/C CALLED ON FREQ REQ BS 2NM INSIDE RMZ CONTINUING SE BOUND AT 1900FT	IDENT AND GIVEN BS

131	12/09/2014			253 DEG 10.5NM - 240 10.5NM	PHONED ESSEX AND THEY APPOLOGISED FOR NOT HANDING OVER / MONITORING	MINOR INFRINGEMENT. TOLD ESSEX TO PUT STRAIGHT TO
132	12/09/2014 1420			ENTERED RMZ AT OSEA - ORBITED THEN LEFT RMZ WESTBOUND	NIL	CONTACT LOST AT HANNINGFIELD
133	13/09/2014 1058			212 10.4NM ENTERED WBOUND THEN 234 10.6 E BOUND AND VACATED TOWARDS EGTO.	VECTORED A319 R/H DWIND FROM SOUTH TO AVOID	BLIND CALLS MADE
134	13/09/2014			OSEA SW BOUND EGTO	A/C CALLED FOR BS AFTER FLYING IN RMZ FOR 3NM	
135	13/09/2014			4NE OSEA TRACKING SW		
136	14/09/2014			W 5NM SW BOUND	BLIND CALLS	
137	14/09/2014			NW OF RMZ 3.4A		
138	14/09/2014			10.5 MILES SW EGMCA2 TRACKING N	A/C SUBSEQUENTLY CALLED - ADVISED AVOIDING ACTION	
139	14/09/14 1348			5 MILE SW OF EGMCA	CALLED BIGGIN	ADVISED BIGGIN ATC
140	14/09/2014			9NM SW 1.9A	BLIND CALL	
141	15/09/2014			10NM SW 3A TO 4A	CALLED THAMES	EGSX?
142	15/09/2014			7SW		REMINDED ABOUT RMZ
143	15/09/2014			266 DEGREES 9.2NM	BLIND CALLED	
144	16/09/2014			WAS ABOUT TO BLIND CALL BUT A/C CALLED (STILL WELL WITHIN THE RMZ)	PUT ONTO # TO IDENTIFY (MODE S A/C) & ASKED TO CALL EARLIER IN FUTURE. STK124P TURNED EARLY AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THIS PRIMARY	
145	18/09/2014			BLIND CALLS		
146	18/09/2014			BLIND CALLS	PUTS ON EGLF N SQUAWK, THEY WILL EDUCATE PILOT	
147	19/09/2014			A/C BLIND CALLED IN FRM RMZ BUT A/C REFUSED A SERVICE. A/C ON TRACK MALDON		
148	19/09/2014			GIVEN A VERY LAST MINUTE WARNING BY THAMES (NOT WORKING THEM DUE WORKLOAD). EZY69GD JUST AIRBORNE ON CPT (Trainee being supervised) GAVE heading 270 to avoid & GOT CLIMB ABOVE 4A WITH THAMES.	RANG GS AIRPORTS TO REQUEST A PRE NOTE OR EARLIER CALL BY A/C DUE RMZ. THEY INVESTIGATED & USED INCIDENT AS LEARNING CURVE. GS & E. CONTROLLER UNWARE OF RMZ	Into EGTR

Class G Incident Log Sheet

Ref Number	Date Time(z)	Flight No / Reg affected A/C	Approach / 24 /06	Nature of Event	Action	Comment
12-001 KD 12-002 JG	01.04.12 1510 14.04.12		Approach 06 N/A	U/K TFC routing from NW from North to South (Via ATZ), indicating A1.4. (traced as ULAC) Fm. 1300-1430. ATC overload by GA Flyout from North Weald to Calais, &Stoke to Duxford	Approx 14 extra track miles to EZY inbound, plus 3 minutes delay to subsequent IFR's.	2 other IFR GA aircraft delayed. ATZ infringement. MOR.
12-003 JG	12.05.12 1116		Approach 06	U/K PSR contact on 4 mile final 06 circling. EZY could not be vectored on a DS to arrive 0n 06.	Offered R24 with tailwind, then given further AVOIDING ACTION to avoid new U/K PSR contact to NE. Separation down to 1nm lateral only.	Both believed to be gliders, slowly tracked north bound, but erratically. Easy to miss on radar. High ATC workload. Extra estimated 24 Track miles.
12-004 JG 12-005 BM 12-006 BM 12-007 BM 12-008 RM 12-009 JG 12-010 JG	24.07.12 1455 20.08.12 0900 20.08.12 0840 20.08.12 0935 20.08.12 1004 21.08.12 0850 21.08.12 1433		Departure 24 Unknown AC converging from NE of CT. Approach 24 Approach 24 Departure 24 Approach 24 Approach 24	U/K ACFT infringed Southend Olympics CTA from NE to SW. AIRPROX with PA34 leaving CTA. Avoiding Action. Kept inside CAS due multiple unknown AC to the North Kept inside CAS due multiple unknown AC to the North Aircraft Taken off NPR due unknown traffic and routing northbound, plus density of other traffic. Late h/o from TC meant EZY outside CAS on B/S Extra Co-ord required due transiting traffic	Avoiding Action Given. Less than 1nm separation. Thames Radar would not give CAS entry of 4000ft until clear of the U/K TFC. TCAS TA received by commercial traffic. Deconfliction minima reduced to 3nm & approx 2 extra track miles given.	Jabiru contacted wrong frequency for airspace (ATLAS).
12-011 JG 12-012 JG 12-013 JG	22.08.12 0929 23.08.12 23.08.12		Departure 24 Departure 24 Approach 24	Late contact due workload Upto 15 'known' Aircraft on frequency Danger Area Active Upto 15 known aircraft on frequency Danger areas Active	A0.8 apparent on radar, did not contact EGMC for several minutes after lifting (due ATC workload/RT loading) from SW to NNE of EGMC.	Deconfliction Minima reduced to btw 3-5 Nm.
12-014 JG	24.08.12 0538		CPT PDR 24	No CAS entry clearance given once airborne -A319 held outside as TCNE wouldn't give higher Altitude		
12-015 JG 12-016 TC 12-017	24.08.12 0838 27.08.12 1255 12-017		Approach 24 NW LYD PDR 24	Unknown ACFT (#7000) indicating A3.2 on track of airways inbound fm NW routing BRAIN -CLN (due #2) Unknown working EGTO over St Marys Marsh, indicating A2.0.	Stopped descent and issued turn inside CAS contrary to release from TCNE to avoid. EZY delayed on ground for 3 minutes, and extended routing by 4 miles once airborne.	
12-018 BM 12-019 BM	31.08.12 31.08.12		Departure 24 Approach 24	2x U/K TFC transiting 6nm west of EGMC on Essex Radar Listening Squawk (But not listening to Essex Radar when contacted by phone by Southend!) U/K TFC PSR manoeuvring 3.5 nm E, then tracked north across FAT of ILS 24T1	EZY held on ground and delayed 4 minutes until no conflict. TI given and offered to break off approach which pilot then requested/accepted.	Increase in ATC workload tracing A/C and re-co-ordinating with Thames Radar due 4 minute delay and trying to gain CAS entry at 4000ft in order to turn on-track. Approx. 16 extra track miles required to vector back to ILS 24.
12-020 TC 12-021 TC 12-022	03.09.12 03.09.12		Approach 24 from N. Departure from 24	Late transfer of TFC fm Wattisham at 3200ft. Acft then called. Co-ordinated to maintain 3000ft, and route via overhead. U/K Paramotor detected over Canvey Island, then flew eastbound infringing the ATZ along the seafont 1016-1020, then westbound 1024-1028. Approx 1000-2000ft.	Delayed aircraft descent to OCAS, then aircraft had to expedite descent to achieve 1000ft below aircraft at 3000ft. EXM on a TS, so T.I. passed on westbound para. and an early right turn on the go-around from the ILS approach (training)	Paramotor then observed operating on climb out R24 for another 3 minutes before leaving the area north-west to Hanningfield area.
12-023 TC	04.09.12		Approach 24 from S.	U/K TFC from SW over St Marys Marsh, indicating 2000ft. EGLF had been working invited acft to freecall either EGMC or EGMH.	EZY kept high in CAS (impacts Thames Radar), with late descent necessitating a Right hand circuit and extra 8 nm over a Left hand circuit	U/K acft appeared to turn away when passing within 2 miles of EZY aircraft, subsequently contacted EGMH. Workload increased due calls to EGLF & EGMH.
12-024 TC	05.09.12 1252		Departure 06 to S	Initial climb limited to 2000ft due 2 overflights co-ordinated by ATC at 3000ft. D138 Active to East.	Increase in crew and ATC workload.	Subsequent Thames radar clearance 'Throughthe gate at 4000ft' aircraft had to leave CAS shortly after entering, and took towards U/K Manston traffic.
12-025 TC	05.09.12 1220		Departure 06 to N	Overflying VFR traffic at 2500ft, routing around D138 and then NNE. Co-ordinated by ATC at 2500ft, resulting in late climb for Departure.	Increase in crew and ATC workload. Extra 4 miles required by vectoring departure whist at 2500ft.	REA climbed once clear of overflight going in same direction, but more slowly.
12-026 TC	05.09.12 1228		Approach 06	EGLF working traffic 6nm west of Southend, tracking SSE thourgh Rwy06 IAP. No co-ordination. LFQV/EGSU Working London FIR at 4000ft. Infringed LTMA from SE to overhead SND. Told by FIR call Southend. Still at 3700ft when called.	Aircraft freecalled Southend and when identified by EGMC was already passing through 3.5 mile final from left to right.	Pilot was routing from North Weald to Le Touquet, requested in future to contact Southend Radar on that route, rather than EGLF LARS.
12-027 RM 12-028 RM	07.09.12 1440 07.09.12 1445		Approach 06 Approach 06	Multiple transiting aircraft, many not talking to Southend, no level available outside CAS to allocate to Thames	Given SABER at 4000ft as luckily D138 complex not active and Thames Radar could accept	Increase in ATC workload at an already busy time. Thames often unable to release at 4000ft and need to descend, due to EGLC departures and arrivals. ATC workload very high.
12-029 RM	07.09.12 1450		Approach 06	Multiple transiting aircraft, many not talking to Southend, no level available outside CAS to allocate to Thames	Given SABER at 4000ft as luckily D138 complex not active and Thames Radar could accept	Thames often unable to release at 4000ft and need to descend, due to EGLC departures and arrivals. ATC workload very high.
12-030 AH 12-031	07.09.12 1615 09.09.12		Departure 24 Approach 24	Aircraft already restricted to 2000ft on departure; after released radar spotted Primary contact over St. Mary's Marsh Northbound Had to keep inside CAS to avoid multiple U/K Aacft in Class G	REA taken off Noise abatement early in order to seek to achieve 5 miles lateral separation Did not descend to OCAS until EZY left CAS to NE of EGMC.	Radar Heading and early climb (from the PDR) arranged with London in order to achieve deconfliction/separation from 3rd transiting aircraft.
12-032 TC	11.09.12 1728		Approach 24	Slow moving unknown primary only contact Sheerness-Shoebury, tracked north edge of D138 (not active at time). EZY on ILS 24.	EZY given TI andadvised that contact would pass 3 miles away, but would not conflict apart from that. Pilot elected to continue.	Breaking off the approach to provide the 5nm on the DS would have resulted in considerable extra delay and tarck miles due the U/K then flying through a 7 mile final N.
12-033 SJ 12-034 JG	14.09.12 17.09.12		Approach 24 CLN PDR 24	U/K TFC PSR at Maldon converging with REA70W. Multiple U/K contacts manoeuvring in Hanningfield/SWF area.	REA turned away from U/K and then back on course when clear. About 8 extra track miles. EZY taken south to reduce workload and co-ordination. Extra noise over town.	U/K acft when at Canevdom (About 3nm NE) an RV7 routing EGSP-LF??Acft transferred to EGMC and advise given. Southabout option not available when D138 complex active.
12-035 JG	18.09.12		CPT PDR 24	Intermittent PSR at EGMT route 8 nm SW ABM. REA71W already departed when detected.Early climb into CAS co-ordinated	Early climb into CAS co-ordinated with Thames Radar and TC NE.	
12-036 JG 12-037 JG	18.09.12 18.09.12		Approach 24 CLN PDR 24	From south. U/K PSR contact intermittent 13 NE EGMC, due D138 active, EZY must go right circuit for 24. U/K TFC South of Osea Island A3.4 Manoeuvring.	EZY vectored for shorter than idela approach (risk from unstabilised approach) Left turn out considered, but higher TC level of 6000 meant un-necessary	Increased ATC workload from tracking U/K contact, rushed descent - not good TRM environment, risk of errors higher. Level inside CAS is rarely available when you need it most - however this one disproves that rule!
12-038 JG 12-039 JG	18.09.12 23.09.12		Approach 24 N/A	U/K TFC Southbound indicating A3.4. REA025 inside CAS to SPEAR at A4.0 U/K TFC airborne from Stow Maries A0.8 climbing, aircraft within 5nm of airport before 1st contact	REA shorter Approach than normal to deconflict from U/K, other Class G TFC co-ordinated 'not above A2.0' None.	High Workload with just 2 acft on frequency because of U/K EGMC resident subsequently called inbound to EGMC. No details in advance of short flight.
12-040 JG	26.09.12		Approach 24	Due WX when on final, EZY requested in event of M/A, HDG 240 A2.0. U/K TFC 6nm West tracking towards climb-out.	EZY advised of TFC and landed safely.	Pipeline subsequently contacted EGMS when 4.5 nm west.
12-041 JG	26.09.12		CLN PDR 24	Due Wx, requested LTO. Due multiple WX avoidances inside CAS, climb above A3.0 could not be gained until 4nm NE EGMC.	Pilot advised of issue and that nothing observed on radar, & accepted handover to London whilst outside of CAS.	London only provide BS OCAS, whereas EZY require a DS.
12-042 TC	27.09.12		CLN PDR 06	ACFT entered CAS, transferred to London. Subsequently seen to leave CAS as no further climb given by London in time.	No TFC in Class G to effect.	London gave climb 3 miles outside and acft re-entered CAS after being OCAS for 5nm.
12-043 TC	27.09.12 0927		LYD PDR 24	Thames Release LYD PDR at A3.0 only, would not give subsequent climb into CAS to EGMC.	TFC transferred to Thames Radar on HDG after checking Class G 'un-populated' ahead of acft track.	Against the procedures btw Thames Radar & EGMC. Use of the 'Gate' would have enabled climb. TR told not to release TFC if CAS not going to be avbl once airborne. Some London ATCOs still say just give acft to me without being aware of EGMC DS responsibilities against Class G TFC.
12-044 AH 12-045 BM	27.09.12 28.09.12		BPK PDR 24 CPT PDR 24	U/K PSR westbound Maldon to HFD, unable to continue HDG340, London could not give climb inside CAS. 2x U/K acft to N & NE of Hanningfield/EVNAS area.	Avoiding action turn HDG 270 given to REA. Climb negotiated with london to enter CAS on vnew hdg. REA given HDG350 to Deconflict from U/K. co-ordinated with TC NE to enter CAS HDG 350 climbing.	
12-046 BM	28.09.12		Approach 24	U/K PSR at BRASO eastbound, when 5nm WNW SABER, U/K turned westbound towards EZY. AVOIDING ACTION given to EZY.	U/K instructed to turn R HDG 160. U/K acft turned away. Options would have been limited if had not, due multiple other contacts all round and D138 Active.	Extra 15 Track miles given to EZY as a result, and 2 subsequent inbounds given extded routing/delay of approximately 7nm each.
12-047 JG	29.09.12		Approach 24	EZY establishing at 7.5 nm R24. Intermittent U/K PSR seen 6nm BRG 030 from EGMC crossing R to L.	Avoiding Action given to EZY, approach broken off to SW, U/K then turned away.	If A4.0 had nor been available, subsequent delay would have meant aircraft missed slot time and further U/K delay thereafter.
12-048 JG	29.09.12		CPT PDR 24	5 VFR transits and U/K in Hanningfield area, EZY on Slot time. GA Rally at Stowe Maries Airfield, no co-ordination or knowledge of this event in advance form organiser. Approx 70 aircraft involved.	Co-ordinated immediate climb into CAS at A4.0 with Thames Radar & TC NE prior to departure. Slot extended with CFMU.	
12-049 JG	29.09.12		N/A	Thames Release LYD PDR at A3.0 only, would not give subsequent climb into CAS to EGMC, once requested when airborne.	Many participants non-squawking. Considerable extra ATC workload caused.	
12-050 TC	01.10.12		LYD PDR 24	Unknown 5 nm SE of the field tracking west indicating 2000ft, EZY taken off noise abatement at 2 NM and turned right on track to EVNAS to avoid.	TFC transferred to Thames Radar on HDG after checking Class G 'un-populated' ahead of acft track.	Against the procedures btw Thames Radar & EGMC. Use of the 'Gate' would have enabled climb against EGLC I/B DET descending to A4.0.
12-051 MA	04.10.12		CPT PDR 24		Unknown tracked to Canvey and then turned SW. Co-ordinated with TC NE and given heading 305 and climb FL80	

12-052 JG	05.10.12		BPK PDR 24	Having co-ordinated previous deps via CPT/BPK. Co-ordinated climb to Alt 4.0 with Thames but did not co-ordinated with TCNE until airborne. Error from SEN due making 3-4 calls each time to attain higher in order to enter CAS.	Called TCNE instantly to co-ordinate climb and apologise!	With CAS it would be possible to H/O ATC once Airborne to London at Alt 3.0 only as inside CAS. This would reduce phonecalls.
12-053 JG	05.10.12		CLN PDR 24	Having obtained release and co-ordinated 4000 climb into CAS with Thames. DEP was unable to depart due cross winds.	Release and climb coordination cancelled (total 4 phonecalls)	With CAS the need to co-ordinate a climb to 4000 would not always be necessary as 3000 would be inside CAS. Reduction in workload for SEN, and TC.
12-054 RL	06.10.12		APPROACH 06	Radar U/S. REA was on a PS on the ILS rwy 06 outbound at 1.5. NW bound traffic was observed on the ATM at 1.5 wearing a london information squawk aiming to cross through an 8nm final. London information contacted however the acft had just left their frequency for EGLF. REA informed and reported the acft in sight. REA subsequently said he got close to 2 aircraft, no information was known on the second.		
12-055 TC	15.10.12 0635		CLN PDR 06	EZY Released by TC but to 'ROCAS'.	No traffic in Class G, therefore got airborne and DS provided. No co-ordination from TC. 3 Phonecalls made by EGMC to TC that were not answered by TC	EZY climbed to 5000ft OCAS and transferred with 10m to CLN OCAS. TC later said they were too busy to answer calls.
12-056 TC	15.10.12 0938		LYD PDR 24	U/K Traffic tracking SE bound, Sq.7000 Indicating 900/1000ft	EZY already released when conflict detected (had been on erratic track in Hanningfield area. EZY instr. to leave Noise Ab. on hdg to better avoid acft.	U/K subsequently tracked 3 miles through Rwy 24 climb-out, did not respond to blind calls. EGMH asked to trace from Sheerness. Increase in workload.
12-057 TC	16.10.12 0625		CLN PDR 24	ACFT entered CAS, transferred to London. Subsequently seen to leave CAS 11NE for 3 miles until climbed inside CAS again by London.	Unlikely EZY crew were advised that they were outside CAS again, and on what service.	Acft initially released 'To remain OCAS'. Subsequently co-ordinated climb to 4000ft by TC SE, who then climbed to 5000ft and transferred to TC East.
12-058 JG	14.10.12		Inbound DET	Thames quiet, coordinated 4.0 HDG 030 DET. Could not descend until 2 NE of SMM and coordinate descent of overflight t/c		
12-059 JP	14.10.12		LYD PDR 24	Unknown traffic 8 NM SW of EGMC, EZY delayed on runway for five minutes, extra coordination required with Thames Radar to ensure climb above 4000ft.		
12-060 JG	08.10.12		CLN PDR 06	Aircraft handed to TCSE as 3000ft only five on departure 06, altitude 6000ft only given 4 miles NE, did not enter CAS until approximately 8 NE SND. 3 phonecalls required to get higher.		
12-061 JG	05.10.12		N/A	Unknown Primary contact passed through climbout of runway 24, no SSR and primary contact lost sw of stoke.		
12-062 JG	05.10.12		BPK PDR 24	Traffic operating Hanningfield, various levels, coordinated climb through Thames then TCNE, 4000ft. Multiple phonecalls and coordination with traffic.		
12-063 JG	05.10.12		Inbound DET	Unknown primary contact at stoke. 4000ft coordinated with Thames, subsequently 3000ft due to Thames Traffic, Aircraft put on heading to deconflict from unknown.		
12-064 MA	03.10.12		Inbound DET	Unknown traffic squawking 7000 indicating 1500ft, 5 miles N/NE of DET. Coordination with Thames to descend subject 7000 squawk, 030 deg. From Det. Thames may not have seen this traffic making 4000ft the only level available.		
12-065 JG	06.10.12		Procedural ILS 06	Airprox with 2 unknown aircraft whilst on baseturn, attempts to contact agency working the aircraft were unsuccessful, CAS would have prevented this.		
12-066 TC	08.10.12		BPK PDR 24	No traffic to affect, but Thames unable to give 4000ft on departure, called once Airborne to get higher from Thames, then had to call TCNE, large number of phonecalls required.		
12-067 RL	09.10.12		06 departures	2 x paragiders operating from Canewdon, up to 1000ft eastbound along river crouch. No RT contact but notified by telephone, departures delayed whilst visual contact sought.		
12-068 JG	13.10.12		All Deps/Arrivals	Multiple contacts operating in vicinity, stoke active, Aeros abeam Bradwell Bay, EGSU fly in. Coordination with TC for 4000ft from the runway, required a very high workload to coordinate.		
12-069 JG	13.10.12		via DET	Unknown Traffic Squawking 7000, indicating 1000ft, 6 miles west fast manoeuvring (pop up). EZY told to disregard noise and turn towards DET with Traffic information		
12-070 JG	14.10.12		N/A	Unknown Traffic Squawking 7000, indicating 1000ft, 4 miles west abeam, runway 24 in use. Rea had departed 5 mins prior		
12-071 JG	24.10.12		LYD PDR 06	Thames released up to 3000ft only to DET. Traffic from Tripo 5.0 then traffic observed eastbound 4.0 due traffic at SND at 5.0. EZY unable to climb above 3.0 until 10 S of SND	Ask pilot if happy to transfer to thames and provided reason. Spoke to thames who said its not their problem they just release with 5 min expiry.	A/C could have been transferred from Airborne to thames with CAS
12-072 JG	30.10.12		Inbound NW Saber	Traffic manoeuvring bradwell bay	Co-ordinated with known traffic	

12-073 JP	03.11.12		Det PDR	Unknown traffic St Mary's Marsh 7nm SW	Avoiding action on dep 270deg then changed to 120deg due to unknown traffic tracking NW bound	High workload and change of turn for pilot on dep. Further co-ord with Thames
12-074 JG	04.11.12		CLN PDR	Unable to climb above 3.0 due Thames Traffic	Nothing on radar outside CAS handed over to TCSE level alt 3.0 outside (BNK014 OVC019)	With CAS would have been in CAS and could have transferred as soon as airborne.
12-075 JG	05.11.12			Ready for dep on CLN PDR traffic WNW 3NM 2700 Thames O/H #7000	Delayed requesting release. Blind transmission to unknown A/C	CAS would provide known environment
12-076 JG	05.11.12			Inbound via DET co-ord Det heading 345 down to 3.0 with Thames. Thames spotted primary contact 8NW DET. (Not observed at SEN radar) Alternative 4.0 co-ordinated then short approach with reduced DS	4000 co-ordinated with new HDG and short app.	CAS would provide a known environment
12-077 TC	09.11.12		LYD PDR 24	Unknown traffic Squawking 7000 approaching from SE to O/H, c,2700ft.	EZY held lined up on runway for 2 minutes whilst aircraft sighted from VCR and released when no conflict.	SR20 that had called shortly before and had been told to standby. continued to O/H where APS was able to accept the call (due workload)
12-078 JG	12.11.12		BPK PDR	Unknown traffic working EGLF observed 12W tracking NE alt 2.4. EZY departing BPK PDR up to 3.0	Contacted EGLF and worked traffic Starspeed18. Co-ordinated climb to 40 with Thames for EZY with turn to 360deg.	Increased workload
12-079 JG	12.11.12		BPK PDR 24	Unknown traffic working EGSS tracking S 11DME N of SND	Contacted Essex to work A/C. Co-ord HDG 180deg against REA which I turned onto 220deg co-ordinated climb with Thames to alt 4000	Increased workload
12-080 TC	18.11.12 1252		BPK PDR 24	Unknown traffic Squawking 7000 approaching from W, indicating 1300ft did not paint until 10W. REA already rolling.	REA given avoiding action when on radar frequency in order to preserve DS, Range decreased to 3nm/400ft. give turn to 135 also.	1st call in response to blind calls from Radar.
12-081 TC	18.11.12 1310		Inbound DET	Unknown traffic Squawking 7000 tracking East north of Crouch indicating C.1300. Conflicted with EZY for RI 24 on DS.	Delayed descent for EZY plus approx. 10 nm extra range. Only able to vector in with RDS and aircraft on TCAS of EZY. Aircraft disappeared at Bradwell at 400ft descending.	EZY already delayed descent due 2 other unknown acft to south of EGMC that necessitated leaving inside CAS with TR approval. 2 other acft late called EGMC subsequently.
12-082 TC	18.11.12 1301		LYD PDR 24	U/K TFC over Stoke area, necessitated immediate turn onto HDG130 at 2.5 nm, in order to preserve DS.	2x ACFT believed to be operating out of Stoke. EZY able to enter CAS at 400ft helped resolve situation.	
12-083	26.11.12		CLN PDR 24	Released CLN 3.0. Once airborne req higher than Thames. Traffic at 5.0. Thames revised due WX. EZY req higher on easterly track (D138/A active)	Advised no traffic observed and told to contact Thames for higher	With CAS would have given to Thames already after departure
12-084 TC	28.11.12 1146		Proc. ILS 06	Unknown Traffic Squawking 0332 6miles West, tracking SE indicating 2100ft, 2 miles O/B in ILS Proc at 1500ft	TI passed to GTM (on a TS only). Phoned Thames Radar who info'd that it was a CS10 with them and just climbing to enter CAS. Passed GTM by 1 mile at approx 2400 ft.	Was traffic from EGSS to the Continent via airways, passed EGMC by 3nm SW still outside CAS, no co-ordination from Thames, nor contact from CS10 pilot.
12-085	02.12.12			Unknown traffic #7000 operating between 6+10nm NE, various levels. Formation of 2 ACFT.	EZY given short approach. BCY released 4000ft to SABER formation left area west bound shortly before BCY turned base	With CAS A/C would have been known
12-086	02.12.12		BPK PDR	Couple of unknowns, one PSR only operating between Hanningfield and EGMT.	Req 4000ft from tThames and climbed into CAS to avoid.	CAS+SIDS to keep A/C in CAS whole route.
12-087	02.12.12		LYD PDR	Unknown aircraft operating SMM	EZY given heading through gate and climb 4	CAS+SIDS to keep A/C in CAS whole route.
12-088 TC	04.12.12			U/K Traffic on #5031 5NW of EGMC tracking southbound. EGLF phoned and asked if we wanted to work, as they did not know where it was going next!	STL transferred to Southend, no traffic conflict as such (by time of transfer had resolved itself) but workload increased at a moderately busy time.	Workload moderate to high at time, phonecall distracted from vectoring REA inbound who went through ILS 24. STL passed 5nm south through Rwy24 climb-out.
12-089	05.12.12			#7000 routing eastbound along river Thames indicating 1300ft	ENZ delayed then given 3 S/A (LYD PDR)	
12-090	14.12.12		LYD PDR	Initially given 5.0 DET. Climb to 4.0 once airborne on HDG 135. Transferred to Thames. Held at 5.0 and left CAS again at 5.0 157deg/13.1DME from SND		With CAS could have handed to Thames from airborne possibly continuous climb
12-091	15.12.12		LYD PDR	U/K traffic at SMM #7047	EZY turned onto 135 then once inside CAS rnto LYD	Had to separate EZY against LNX inbound from CAS whilst giving vectors to avoid U/K traffic
12-092	15.12.12		Inbound from south for 24	U/K PSR traffic south of Bradwell Bay Southbound	EZY given avoiding action (earlier turn onto LL2) of 270 then 260	PSR was weak, unsure if was an ACFT suddenly appeared (lots of interference) Shortly after LCBBM ULAC called at 800ft
12-093	18.12.12			Unknown #7000 southbound from EGSL - Hanningfield 6M west abeam	Co-ordinated 4000' saber with TCNE	CAS would mean known traffic
12-094	18.12.12			#7000 from EGSG A2.8 3.5 West of SND. Then tracked NE altitude 1.7		EZY had departed 5 minutes before
12-095	21.12.12			unknown operating 5NM NTH BTW 1.0+3.0, fast moving. STL10 believes A/C is a hunter/GNAT	STL+STL passed TFC as they were operating in the area. STL10 visual with unknown.	Unknown A/C very fast moving (308kts at one point) with tight turn. If providing DS would have been difficult to provide minima.
12-096	21.12.12			Jet P 250kts manoeuvring around ridley not talking to me	Called SX, tried to call him, got visual confirmation on type from GBZHF	Second time this week
12-097 AH	30.12.12		LYD PDR 24	U/K Traffic #7000 from NW to S, through c. 4.5 miles SW of ARP. No contact with ATC	EZY delayed from departing for 4 minutes whilst U/K cleared area.	EZY was on a slot time and any further delay would have meant renegotiating CTOT.
13-001	02.01.13			#7000 6N west MC tracking S indicating 2300ft	EZY held on ground until #7000 south on final APP/climb south	#7000 subsequently called MC
13-002	02.01.13			Initialt dct saber 4/0 unknown 7000 climbing to 2.4 o'sea island and unknown N bradwell bay 3.0	Re-called TCNE co ordinated 3.0 SND	12 aircraft on frequency. High workload and relying on Thames approval.
13-003	02.02.13			Inbound also saber behind REA. As above.	Re called TCNE co ordinated 4.0 SND and with Thames	
13-004	03.01.13			Unknown traffic #7000 4W at A3.4 had already infringed Thames class A	Blind TC. Incent on non operational mode 5	
13-005	11.01.13		BPK PDR	Release requested at 0641. TC NE ATCO would only release to 'Remain OCA's' Not issued until 13 minutes later at 0654	Not accepted by Southend ATCO as against agreed procedures to present traffic EVNAS at or climbing to 4000ft. Sets a precedent that causes problems when busier Class G	Several southbound departures form Stansted during the 13 minute delay, TC NE apparently made no effort to stop EGSS freeflow on deps.
13-006	28.02.13		Approach 06	Whilst under vectors for RB 06, pilot would not descend to 2000ft due TCAS alert below. Nothing seen on radar that could account for it (nor on Selex on test)	Pilot asked to intercept ILS at 3000ft which was OK. Just prior to establishing, an intermittent primary only contact seen by both radars (no Mode C/S), already just had passed by.	Intermittent primary return tracked E. over St Mary's Marsh, then reversed and disappeared again from radar at BRG230 range 9nm. Microlight type speed. Still no Mode C/S.
13-007	01.03.13		Approach 06	Whilst being vectored for Right Base ILS 06, U/K traffic seen 9m west, tracking 190 unverified 2000ft, not in contact. Proceeded to fly through 10 mile final.	EZY advised that may have to be broken off with avoiding action. When re-assessed, EZY pilot elected to continue approach.	Aircraft passed 3nm west of EZY, who was turned in 2 miles earlier than desirable. Accompanying aircraft had called routing via O/H
13-008	25.01.13				EZY given left turn HDG130 from Rwy24 (Clearance from Thames was DET 4000'	recoordinated with Thames. Pilot expedited climb into CAS
13-009	27.01.13			Unknown traffic (from EGSG) operating between Maldon and Hanningfield Alt 3000'	Coordinated 4000' towards SABER and vectored around unknown TCNE reluctant to give 4000' initially	Only 1 unknown increased workload for us and TCNE and extra workload.
13-010	26.01.13		RWY24 in use	Unknown #7000 manoeuvring Convey high Speed alt1600' 3 SW. Runway in use 24		
13-011	24.01.13		Inbound Det	#7000 1NM East of EGTG and tracked N passing 8.5 DME SW EGMC. A/C indicating alt1500. EZY inbound via DET for Runway 06	EZY initially left at 4000' and reported traffic on TCAS agreed on 5nm final with Option to intercept at 1500'. EZY left 4NM behind and to the right of #7000	
13-012	12.01.13			STL operating SMM VARIOUS ALT. EZY inbound. STL reluctant to operate not above 2000' and was close to final	had to take EZY over the top with late descent and wide turn SW to establish. was within 3NM and visual	Very high controller workload trying to achieve deconfliction minima.
13-013	03.01.13			Unknown Primary only 7-8DME SW manoeuvring	Delayed Departure until sufficient distance from unknown traffic available	
13-014	03.02.13			Unknown #7000 O'Sea Island/Bradwell manoeuvring 1400ft	Monitored with consideration	
13-015	04.02.13		Arrival	U/K Observed infringing the ATZ A2.0 from the west then tracked NE 1 n/m North of final approach until Saber. EZY establishing ILS at 10 DME at Saber U/K turned North	EZY broken off at 8 DME and vectored approximately extra 20 miles climbed TO 3000ft	U/K eventually contacted me
13-016	05.02.13		Dep LYD	Sq 7000 8nm SW tracking SE at 200ft vs EZY departing on a LYD released on a standard dep.	Req to Thames to put EZY on hdg 125 to avoid traffic.	
13-017	06.02.13		Arrival 06	3 #7000 to N and W of Southend.	EZY co ordinated to SND altitude 4000ft then vectored downwind right RWY06	
13-018	06.02.13		Arrival 06	3 #7000 to N and W of Southend.	saber 4000ft then descended altitude 3000ft hdg 190 and vectored downwind right RWY06	
13-019	06.02.13		Arrival 06	2 #7000 NW of Southend.	REA vectored East of MC altitude 4000ft then descended 3000ft downwind right RWY06.	
13-020	07.02.13			7000 sq manoeuvring 8 miles final RWY24	Subsequently called and identified. Co-ordination achieved.	
13-021	07.02.13			altitude 1300ft manoeuvring SW. 2 #7000 manoeuvring 7-8 miles W operating at 2000ft.		
13-022	15.02.13			Non transponding primary contact returned 12 West tracking SE no contact. Passed 5 DME west abeam through climbout RWY 24 in use. Mode A/C on abeam D146. Still no contact. Altitude 1700ft. Manoeuvred around Sheerness		ATR43 due in 15 mins. A319 departed 10 mins prior. Contact faint at times.
13-023	16.02.13			Up to 20 overflights on frequency with many not on Sqk. Tracking toward SEN.	The best we could good and with TC	
13-024	16.02.13			2x inbound ifr traffic working London FIR refused to track to EGMC. Flew 2 SE abeam at 2000ft	APP at time traffic info passed phonecalls to FIR	traffic not able to track to SEN in class G. Was within half mile inbound SI 24 at same ALT.
13-025	18.02.13		CLN PDR	CLN PDR rwy 06, Thames only able to give 3A.	DS Acft outside CAS until 12NE of SND (Thames then gave 6A)	believed to be due LC dep on a CLN PDR at 4A.
13-026	18.02.13		LYD PDR	LYD PDR RWY 06, Thames only able to give 3A, u/k traffic PSR at Sheerness 3A.	EGMC had to try and get A/C through the gate and also around D13A, Acft at 3A until 6NM SE of SND (LYD 6A given subsequently). Luckily u/k traffic continued NW so able to achieve 4NM deconfliction distance	difficult to achieve gate and transfer Thames easily, balance of leaving CAS, avoid DA and avoid U/K traffic would not have been able to release DS traffic until formally identified
13-027	19.02.13			unknown #7000 manoeuvring 6 West of SND subsequently called us STL 2200ft	identified and given basic service	
13-028	19.02.13			2 poss Microlite W of Stoke no SSR. U/K #7000 O'sea D138/A active rwy 24.	blind call #7000 from ML was listening out and identified.	
13-029	21.02.13			#7000 Hanningfield A3.1 Unverified.	2x with TCNE 4.0 HDG 095 - waited until passed.	Extra workload and track miles for
13-030	21.02.13			#7000 8 SW RWY 06 in use not talking to SEN A2000	Monitored with consideration	
13-031	21.02.13			#7000 3 DME West abeam manoeuvring A2000 circumnavigating ATC. Acft transitted North abeam toward Burnham. Rwy 06 in use.	Blind Tx A/C was listening out and departed area.	observed c152 from VCR.
13-032	22.02.13			TFC 10 nm W of SND SE bound EZY DET RI06 3A.	Co-ordination with EGLF to turn 5030 southbound, turned EZY onto a 5NM final and descended to 1500ft and achieved 4nm lateral separation	Earlier handover from EGLF would have helped but just extra workload during busy time and less than ideal approach. Acft believed to be GSACI from mode S.
13-033	24.02.13			SRA RWY 06 U/K #7000 routed from 5NM Northbound through 4.5 mile final indicating 2.4	Passed traffic and vectored GTK South through FAT to keep clear.	
13-034	28.02.13			#7000 Climbing 4.0 Abberton traffic manoeuvring Hanningfield REA climb 4.0 SABER RWY 06 in use		extra track miles for REA

13-035	28.02.13			Inbound (see previous comment) 2x 7000 microlites indicating 1.0 and 1.2 8 West abeam slow moving. Pop up traffic 1 o'clock 1 mile no 'c' on radar.	several blind tx - no response. 10 extra track miles high ATCO workload	
13-036	03.03.13			#7000 5 SW not on freq 2200ft rwy 06 in use		
13-037	03.03.13			#7000 A1700 Climbing NE EGTO #7000 9dme 06 final(gkmkm) subsequently popped up again at 7 DME with EZY establishing 5 mile final	coordinated 4000ft with Thames	Short Approach
13-038	04.03.13			7.5 SW through 06 final A2100 climbing to A2500	EZY coordinated 5000ft 180 DEG.	RWY06 in use, REA landed 3 minutes prior
13-039	14.03.13			U/K crossed 6 mile climbout A2.2 #7000 NW to SE	Traffic passed	
13-040	14.03.13			3x Traffic working SEN A2.0 known. Thames could not give A4.0 due traffic in RMA	3x phonecalls to deconflict and get higher with TC NE	
13-041	15.03.13		BPK PDR	Released BPK unable to get higher due Thames traffic towards overhead A4.0 then had to wait until turning inbound LAM climbing A4.0 which put in conflict with other traffic descending A7.0 LAM inbound LCY.	EZY already handed to TCNE but not on frequency	
13-042	26.03.13		DET INBOUND	Inbound via DET R106 U/K #7000 operating at 5 miles on final approach between 10 and 7 miles from surface up to A3.0	EZY kept inside CAS at A4.0, was going to take acft through final for left hand circuit but U/K then tracked N aswell so decided to turn EZY right to lose height and establish right-hand. The U/K then turned E so had to vector EZY for a short approach to establish at 4 miles. EZY ended up doing 10 extra track miles.	U/K was (gyro) found on Selex Mode S ACFT called up 10 minutes later for a transponder check! I politely asked him if he could call in the future if he want to operate there.
13-043	27.03.13			U/K primary SE bound EZY held at 4A taken through ILS then turned in from North		
13-044	28.03.13			Civil hawk EGSU/LFAT tracking very fast S A1.5 to pass West abeam. Hawk initially requested to route overhead due R106 and when Hawk pilot did not understand my transmission attempted twice to orbit. ACFT appeared to not understand/ignored instruction.	broken off R106 approx 6 miles as unsafe to continue with communication issues	workload generally very high at time of incident with a control zone could have been given an instruction to remain outside CAS
13-045	30.03.13			U/K traffic operating 3miles and 8 miles NE on an aero squark. Turned out to be a formation of 3 (possibly E300 out of EGSX)	We were using RWY06 so luckily no affect on arrivals and no deps at the time they were maneuvering.	The U/K formation appeared again in the same position later on in the day operating for a period of 45 mins both times.
13-046	30.03.13			#7000 operating on a 10 mile final RWY06 EZY R106 inbound from S U/K traffic operating between surface and A2.5	EZY vectored for a short approach 5 mile final	U/K was giro out of stoke (selex) ACFT remained in St Mary's Marsh area for 45 minutes despite pending traffic the U/K's continued to operate 8 SW. Explicit instructions had to be given to achieve deconfliction.
13-047	01.04.13			U/K traffic on EGKB conspicuity A2.2 10 miles SW towards St Mary's Marsh - no contact	Monitored traffic left the area	

13-048	01.04.13			#7010 Fast jet operating 5nm N high speed and Osea, no contact	Monitored	
13-049	01.04.13			U/K non SSR SNW manoeuvring and unknown #7000 A2.1 (N101DW) SI 06 no contact. 06 in use operating	Monitored	
13-050	01.04.13			#7000 R44 routing from ps near EGMH to ps near EGLL passing through 8nm 06. only called when he heard me pass traffic to EZY	EZY DWLH rwy 06 passed traffic info and vectored for a 5 mile final. EZY happy to continue after advising the U/K will pass 2.5 miles behind him	the U/K called when he heard me pass traffic to the EZY. Pilot was reminded to call earlier if passing through final. He was working EGMH
13-051	02.04.13			U/K #7000 airborne Stoke A1.6 along coast towards EGMT/EGML no contact	Monitored	Left area before approaches commenced. A/c had mode C/S. GKMMK
13-052	03.04.13			#7000 U/K operating 10 W within half mile similar altitude no contact	Traffic passed, pilot manoeuvred to avoid.	
13-053	06.04.13	DET INBOUND		From DET left at A4.0 due PSR/#7000 U/K. Unable to descend for an approach rwy 06 due U/K PSR transiting final approach track or close by	Co-ordinated with Thames to keep a/c at A4.0. Vectored around final approach for minimum delay	Luckily EGLC closed so TC Thames accommodated request. REA delayed. Pilot suggested at one point if it would be better if he entered the hold at SND
13-054	06.04.13			(Delay no 2 to EZY, see above)	REA given extra 20 miles via SABER and descended NE of SND	EZY a/c vectored in a box three times over final approach track 06 to try and find a gap between U/K a/c then given short approach due U/K PSR 7nm SW of SND tracking
13-055	06.04.13			Vectored through final approach track from S then given short approach rwy 06 due U/K PSR 8nm W of SND tracking northbound	Vectored for Left hand cct rwy 06 from S	Only max 3nm deconfliction could be given
13-056	06.04.13			Delays on departure due U/K traffic transiting close/overhead SND. Controller workload and frequency congestion made it difficult to identify/co-ordinate with all a/c calling EGMK	Held a/c on ground, tried to prioritise calls but sheer volume of a/c calling, lack of VDF and U/K a/c made it not possible to depart a/c sooner	RIVO filed for todays 4 events suggesting for support staff both ATCA/ATCO to be available. Possible use of second Radar position and importance of the VDF. Potential ATC overload. Frequency congestion prevented a/c being replied to in good time. 2 occasions that I know of a/c went to en route without service from southend
13-057	07.04.13			U/K fast moving manoeuvring Dengie 12NE, no mode C. Unknown, possible microlight st marys marsh, only Stoke and St marys marsh	vectored through O/H 20N of track	
13-058	08.04.13			U/K #7000 manoeuvring A1.5, EXM on TS, traffic passed and visual rwy 06 8SW.	Traffic passed, blind transmission to U/K	
13-059	14.04.13			passed 2.5 miles SW of SEN tracking SE bound. At pier squark changed to 7000 - then called at the Pier SE bound EGSG/LFAT for BS. Had been working Essex Radar!	No acft affected	
13-060	21.04.13			U/K fast contact switched off SSR at Hanningfield to operate 8-9 mile final RWY 24 with 24 in use.		
13-061	23.04.13			Aero acft 3xYak? SX/SX believed. Orbiting 9nm final runway 24. No height info.	REA 4.0 SABER had to be kept 5.0 SABER with Thames until clear of traffic.	manoeuvred between 7-9 nm final for about 25minutes
13-062	24.04.13			U/K #7000 PASSED 2.5NM EAB North to South not on frequency at 3.3A	EZY released by Thames, through the gate initially cleared straight ahead to deconflict against unknown	
13-063	24.04.13			U/K primary contact pop-up stoke	EZY turned left to avoid 7 track miles extra	
13-064	24.04.13			U/K #7000 8-9 miles NE on final. Rwy 24 in use EZY pending		
13-065	26.04.13			U/K traffic at St Mary's Marsh (7047)	tried to coordinate A4.0 with Thames, initially okay but then requested descent A3.0 (initially inside CAS) due other traffic overhead SND descending A4.0 Had to vector EZY through final approach so coordinated and turned EZY onto 5 mile final from N.	Thames called EGKB and asked 7047 to call EGMK if on frequency. Thames helpful as much as they could but eventually EZY had to leave CAS.
13-066	27.04.13			U/K PSR appeared just south of 4 mile final RWY06 North bound. REA just about to establish at 8DME.	Traffic info passed twice pilot asked if he wanted to continue or break off approach, he elected for another approach so repositioned to the S for a RHC and remained clear of U/K PSR again on final.	PSR very slow moving possibly clutter but equally could have been an aircraft.
13-067	30.04.13			Inbound RI06 traffic manoeuvring st marys marsh and traffic manoeuvring hanningfield.	Co-ordinated A4.0 with TCNE and Thames. EZY luckily went visual with tight approach. approx 6-10 extra track miles on all a/c	
13-068	02.05.13			U/K Stoke, #7010	vectored NE then N of final approach	
13-069	02.05.13			U/K Stoke, U/K St marys marsh	vectored NE then N of final approach	5 miles not achieved
13-070	02.05.13			U/K primary traffic 6m W tracking S	A4.0 to O/H with Thames. Blind transmission	
13-071	06.05.13			U/K traffic manoeuvring 6nm final 24.	A4.0 towards Osea then E to Bradwell then S to crouch then W towards final as U/K tracked N	
13-072	15.05.13			U/K #7000 hanningfield	Co-ordinated climb A4.0 SABER, then called and identified	
13-073	19.05.13			Primary contact through Overhead not talking to APS. Motor Glider 2-3A	Delay to req release for CLN Dep 06	
13-074	21.05.13			Student traffic not responding (EGSG traffic)	Gave EZY wide turn E and S of final due to U/K intentions of EGSG traffic	
13-075	21.05.13			Traffic not responding	vectored EZY from N to close from the south	
13-076	01.06.13	DET ARR R06		Unknown #7000 11nm west of SND tracking east, EZY from DET being vectored for RI runway 06.	Asked the pilot of EZY if he can accept 4nm final, 3 mile deconfliction and updates of traffic. Blind call to unknown a/c not effective (nothing on Mode S). A/c subsequently turned south and never came within 3nm of EZY.	Potential avoiding action, breaking off approach. Unstable approach.
13-077	02.06.13			2 x primary only 8 nm west and nm NW of SND. No R/T contact.	Delayed departure	
13-078	02.06.13	CLN R24		Glider operating 6nm SSW of airfield with restricted movement and limited R/T.	EZY told he could disregard noise abatement and make an early turn.	EZY turned at 3/4nm at approx 1000ft.
13-079	05.06.13			U/K primary only flies through final APP 06 not working APS 6nm North to South	RHD 06 given avoiding action and an extra 20nm track miles pilot observes acft as approx 1.5A	acft tracked to DET then lost contact.
13-080	07.06.13			2 x unknown primary contacts observed 10NW tracking SW.	EZY given a vectored hold overhead and a wider circuit. Blind transmissions made to the unknowns.	Unknowns passed 6nm SW, no contact.
13-081	19.06.13	VFR RWY 06		Unknown primary contact crossed 4 SW ahead inbound VFR straight in approach.	Blind transmissions.	
13-082	19.06.13			Unknown a/c #7000 north to south passed 6nm west abeam through a 6nm final Rwy 06 tracking towards Rochester airfield.	EZY given 10 extra track miles to avoid the unknown a/c.	
13-083	25.06.13			Unknown a/c at Shoebury westbound indicating 900 ft #7000	Blind transmission put out when a/c over the pier tracking westbound and responded routing EBAW to EGSG. Aircraft was turned further to the NW to minimise the delay to EZY519C	EZY was delayed by 2 minutes due passage of a/c.
13-084	26.06.13	DVR		Unknown PSR TFC S of canvey 2 miles, tracking north. Microlight speed.	1 minute delay to EZY due U/K traffic	blind call put out and acft turned back South and disappeared in the vicinity of Stoke
13-085	30.06.13			177 LARS over flights		
13-086	01.07.13			U/K acft Mode S	ADI became visual (R22) APPROX 1.5	A/C passed 3 nm W abeam tracking West. REA never within 4.5 miles
13-087	01.07.13			U/K P28A (mode S) TRACKING 060 8 DME SW. EZY inbound	EZY vectored from PIER to North abeam to avoid.	
13-088	01.07.13			U/K #7000 9 SW Tracking SE indicating 2.1A.	Delayed departure blind tx a/c was listening 2.0A Identified.	
13-089	04.07.13			U/K ACFT Bradwell SW bound	EZY vectored around for visual approach	
13-090	04.07.13			28 Flex Wing microlights over the crouch 2A ot seen on Radar		
13-091	06.07.13			2 U/K manoeuvring on or South of Final app rwy 06	Blind calls made to the two acft with no reply both A/C coordinated with Thames to maintain 4000 routed via SND then descended to 1.5 for a 5NM Final once U/K clear.	Extra workload, RT coordination, extra track miles, more potential conflict inside class G, shorter potentially unstable approach.
13-092	06.07.13			U/K PSR TFC	Turned ACFT onto heading after DET 050 (previously coordinated 350) then A/C had to be taken via SND for a left hand pattern rwy 06. Acft vectored for a tight left hand onto 5nm final (pilot agreement). Pilot of EZY warned of possible late warning/avoiding action	
13-093	06.07.13			Multiple U/K acft SW of MC between 8 and 12 miles AC East of DET A3 Northbound.	VOE remained at A4.0 inside CAS then taken through final APP, left turn back onto Final.	
13-094	06.07.13			Multiple U/K acft SW of MC between 8 and 12 miles AC East of DET A3 Northbound.	EZY from North vectored through OH to the South then back to North through final app then left turn for final.	
13-095	07.07.13			U/K Traffic 10nm SW, SE bound 2.4. Delayed descent for SCW	Blind call to acft, coordination with Thames to keep A/C inside CAS, finally called and agreed below 2000ft.	Extra workload and track miles
13-096	08.07.13			Passed through 5 mile final RWY 06 not working Essex. A0.5	Phoned Essex. Not speaking to them. Blind tx not working either.	
13-097	11.07.13			various PSR contacts operating on 8 mile final near st marys marsh	short approach j35 on left base rwy 06 had to be given a left turn (long way round) to turn on LLZ.	usual extra workloads
13-098	12.07.13	DET		Had to be routed NE then East of SND due traffic above.	left hand cct had to vector a/c extra track miles and then short approach	usual
13-099	12.07.13			EGSU fly in and dsplay. Overflights not including unknown traffic 150 overflights.		
13-100	12.07.13			U/K PSR AT 5NM tracking southbound through 4nm final	EZY given short approach traffic info deconfliction service reduced distance 2.5nm to get A/C in ahead of transit, kept on APS frequency til landed.	usual extra workloads plus a/c stayed on frequency longer than was ideal
13-101	15.07.13			U/K TFC popped up St Mary's marsh, slow moving PSR	rwy 06 EZY dw given shorter approach then ideal and non-standard circuit - led to going through final and establishing at 4.5 miles	
13-102	18.07.13			Paraglider not seen (08372) on radar passed close down his starboard side abeam 5nm		could have led to unstable approach and/or go-around
13-103	20.07.13			Taken north of 06 final due intermittent unknown 8nm slow moving.		pilot happy to continue nothing seen on radar (airprox)
13-104	20.07.13			2 X unknown SWF Southbound Runway 06 in use.	held at 4000 DET to North of final	PSR only
13-105	03.08.13 1125			Unknown primary abeam Stoke	coordinated 4.0 with Thames until passed traffic	
13-106	03.08.13 1540			U/K from South approaching 5nm. EZY diverted North overhead at A2000 Vectored for a 5 mile final 06.		

13-107	04.08.13		passed through 24 climb out 3nm SW of SEN not on frequency	blind calls but no response	
13-108	06.08.13		EZY ON RB 24 RI H145. Pop up traffic BURNHAM TRACKING eastbound EZY avoiding action	avoiding action, blind call and tower look out	PSR only
13-109	13.08.13		U/K Fast Jet (vampire) manauvering osea/dengie		youtube video
13-110	17.08.13		U/K flexwing micro 2.5nm east abeam	visually acquired by VCR	4x commercial had landed 10 mins before.

13-111	17.08.13			U/K traffic 8nm A1200	Delayed getting release on EZY LYD PDR.	
13-112	18.08.13			Manoeuvring on 8nm final Rwy24 previously appeared to lock on to LLZ at about 12D, descend from 3.0 and then broke off at 7nm (between 2 and 3A)	blind calls to A/C but no response. STL had previously been RI24.	was booked in for a RI but never contacted EGMC ATC on RT.
13-113	19.08.13			U/K traffic abeam SWF tracking East. A1200. EZY inbound via TRIPO - remained 4 miles North of final - D138/D138A active.	Traffic passed and blind TX made.	observed contact and updated A319 crew who were happy to continue.
13-114	19.08.13			2x U/K contacts 3-4 mile final believed to be Glider North to South. U/K 7000 Isle of Sheppey 2500 NW bound, U/K South of Stoke no SSR. U/K pop-up 5NE possible glider. EZY vectored to hold overhead	co-ordinated hold at SPEAR A4000 with Thames	no R/T contact D138/D138A 18 min delay
13-115	19.08.13			U/K traffic passed 2.5nm East Northbound	No traffic affected. Spotted from VCR, glider approx 2500-3000ft	
13-116	20.08.13			U/K glider south of field 10-15 miles	EZY 4000 inside CAS with later decent than ideal, restricted by D138 active	
13-117	20.08.13			U/K TFC over River CCH SW bound	EZY warned of late vectoring requirement inbound from South, restricted by D138 active. Tower spotted glider at est 3000ft confirmed by another A/C at 3100ft.	led to a hurried decent and A/C turning through LLZ, late establishing.
13-118	23.08.13 0920			U/K traffic climbing into radar cover South from Thurrock, EZY on on LB 06 2000FT HDG 145.	EZY given avoiding action turn on to HDG 120 to clear the TFC more quickly.	continued for 6 mile ILS U/K acft mode S GFEAB #7666 Did not respond to blind Tx.
13-119	23.08.13 1129			U/K traffic at Stoke intermittent)	EZY given turn 20 deg to avoid being put into conflict with another U/K to S/W	
13-120	27.08.13			2x U/K. Primary only 5nm - RWY06 in use. traffic 8 SW	4.0 SND coordinated with Thames contacted Essex for H/O extra vectors.	
13-121	30.08.13			U/K TFC seen 5nm Northbound A vortex 1100FT on mode C	EZY DEP 24 instructed to disregard noise abatement and turn early to CLN (passing 2500ft only)	Chinook sighted by EZY pilot. H47 went to Bushey Hill (SWF) and then further North
13-122	30.08.13			U/K Primary only contact passed 3NM WAB South bound.	req DS held on ground as U/K contact passed through a 3.5mile climbout.	visual from VCR, 2 microlights about 1500ft.
13-123	03.09.13 1213			No mode A/C/S on new radar only primary. Mode A/C on NATS feed.	observation	Mode S/A/C appeared when he was SE abeam. Passing 4A climbing. He had not changed the settings. Transponder make: Garec HD.
13-124	05.09.13 1200			U/K 3nm N 2mile final 24 A1300	passed traffic to EZY and prepared to hold @ TRIPO	U/K traffic was monitored
13-125	07.09.13			Slow rotorway exec couldn't get through quick enough. Controller workload prevented earlier intervention.	5 minute delay due rotorway traffic from benfleet to pier.	pleasure flight Takely: Canvey - Pier - East Abeam - Stow Maries.
13-126	16.09.13			U/K fast moving primary, 6 miles West tracking north. No contact.	blind tx to U/K	lack of release from London meant U/K had passed through
13-127	16.09.13	CLN		U/K N139MT from SW flew up Thames towards climb out.	contacted EGKB and traffic identified and coordinated.	
13-128	17.09.13			No ETA from TC - limited planning time #7000 converging from Mersea Island indicating 2.3A, EZY at 4 now OCAS only just on freq. From TC NE	avoiding action given to EZY, late decent, vector through ILS.	Higher prob of rushed/unstabilised approach/ overrun. 2.5 miles at 1700ft btw.
13-129	17.09.13			U/K #7000 tracking SE slowly no Mode C.	EZY already descending 3000ft blind calls put out to #7000 to no avail. Thames Radar asked to stop decent EZY at 4000 inside CAS as a result.	
13-130	18.09.13			U/K TFC working London info A5500 25NE SND tracking South. Operating Canvey Island A1400 unverified.	Coordinated with Thames subject and monitored incase of M/A blind Tx.	
13-131	18.09.13			U/K #7000 approached from the north no mode c. passed 2.5nm west abeam then SW to 8nm believe turning NE	cancelled release with ADI and Thames	9 minute delay
13-132	21.09.13 1103	DET		2x U/K Aerobatics 8 mile final rwy 24. Then Bradwell no contact.	Coordinated with Thames 4.0 to SND to hold. Blind Tx made no response - once clear of area vectored wide DWRH 24.	Blind Tx made
13-133	22.09.13 1610			Inbound Rwy24 U/K primary only observed pier tracking NE. Visual from VCR flex wing microlight.	Updated EZY and kept on radar frequency until tfc passed.	Blind TX made
13-134	26.09.13 1115			multiple slow moving contacts abeam 5NM PSR only RWY06 in use.	coordinated 4.0 with Thames through the overhead for DLW 06	
13-135	26.09.13 all day			Stoke 5NM very active minimal contact	coordinated 4.0 with Thames. Additional vectors required to remain clear.	
13-136	27.09.13 1315			flying South	Phoned EGLF. They were too busy to pass even act type and would phone back. When they phoned back acft were passing eachother (I was passing t/k to RVR)	RVR was on a TS given t/k and saw on second passing. ACFT called after it had passed through ILS at 7.5 miles.
13-137	27.09.13 1230			LIRN-EGMC Accepted descent 3.0 fm Thames and on HDG. U/K seen Eastbound, no mode C.	Thames contacted - then thought ACFT had already left 4A, but managed to keep up at 4A before transferring	Spitfire on local detail. Called us after the incident when over Sheppey.
13-138	28.09.13			U/K traffic transit 5 2nm W abeam 2.7	Had to vector EZY and VOE around a bit and eventually got them in reduced DS.	
13-139	28.09.13			Multiple U/K ACFT everywhere	from south vectored through final approach then right turn back through overhead then right turn Down Wind.	
13-140	29.09.13			Multiple U/K ACFT everywhere	From South vectored through final approach to miss A/C 8nm to the SW then left turn onto final.	
13-141	02.10.13			U/K traffic South abeam 4nm tracking towards 06 final approach. EZY on ILS 06.	Traffic info passed to EZY and was kept on APP freq until 2NM final.	No response from O-TM despite several blind Tx
13-142	05.10.13			U/K acft primary only track bradwell towards 8nm final	Vectored VOE until 15nm then right turn heading 270	U/K Acft disappeared at 8nm mile
13-143	05.10.13			U/K traffic primary only routed from hanningfield to canvey then anti clock round the ATZ	Waited for traffic to clear climbout caused 5 minute delay	In ADI this meant RWY occupied for 5 minutes with 5 acft orbiting waiting to make approach
13-144	06.10.13			Significant delay due multiple unknown acft on final and at barling	Extended delaying action for all acft. Avoiding action taken.	
13-145	06.10.13			as above	as above	
13-146	06.10.13			as above	as above	
13-147	06.10.13			Unknown acft (multiple) on climb out	Delays on ground	
13-148	06.10.13			as above	as above	
13-149	18.10.13	BPK RWY 06		U/K traffic east of hanningfield. EZY given vector 350 to maintain deconfliction service and early climb with Thames	If climb was not avbl it would not have been possible for aircraft to continue on PDR and if TC NE would not/could not be ? Would have to have been orbited in class G. Aircraft traced was an ev97 out of EGML (GCESV)	
13-150	24.10.13	RI24		called up at barling heading to burnham at 1000ft. NOT ON RADAR.	Avoiding turn given to EZY. Planned LH circuit became RH circuit with extra 15 track miles due to other co ordinated traffic. GKD given routing through 3 mile final.	
13-151	24.10.13	BPK PDR		Given 2000' due overflight at 3000'. Once airborne U/k #7000 appeared 8nm W indicating 2000' NNE heading.	REA given avoiding turn oto 360, and then further vectors around known traffic already co ordinated. Extra 5 track miles	
13-152	03.11.13	LYD PDR		LYD PDR ? To turn R through ? Due unknown @ 5NM	Right Turn ? ? Due Unknown 5NM	Climb to 4000' would have ? Them
13-153	07.11.13			Unknown traffic from EGSK tracking along Crouch Eastbound to burnham 800' LNX on DS	LNX went visual DLWH 24 held out by radar until turning ? Within ATZ. Blins transmissions made, no contact.	within 1nm of ATZ
13-154	16.11.13	CLN		Unknown contact bearing 020 9.2 DME (o'sea) EZY airborne CLN PDR climbing 4.0 only (no thames inbound)	Passed traffic and deconfliction advise. Called Thames for higher/ 5000' given.	There was no traffic to prevent thames giving 6000'+ from the ground or at least once airborne
13-155	21.11.13			Unknown traffic #7000 at 400ft operating between hanningfield, SWF, Maldon. REA inbound 4000' Saber	Kept REA at 4000' and vectored 5 miles from Unknown. RWY06 vectored DWRH	Unknown was from EGSG. Tried calling a few times but never got an answer.
13-156	12.12.13			U/K slow moving contact from the East and via 2.5 SW of SEN no ALT.	Extended EZY to allow for potential M/A and to achieve SNM deconfliction blind Tx's made.	Extra 8 track miles as a result
13-157	20.12.13	CPT		U/K crossed 8.5 dme tracking 030. EZY just airborne on CPT PDR	EZY given prompt turn at 2.5 DME to hdg 340. Climb from PDR co-ordinated with thames	Several other light ACFT in contact made options severely limited
13-158	21.12.13			passed 9 miles SW routing EGBG-EBKT at 1000ft LAM-DVR	Sq. 7000, called Manston at King North, did not contact Southend	Cloud BKN011
13-159	29.12.13 1140			1140. U/K passed through canvey island SE bound, no mode S. Indication 2.5 mode A	TFC info passed to c152 on a BS from EBKT-EGSG at 2.7 descending to 2.0. Took Avoidance on ACFT when sighted	
14-001	06.01.14			Unknown Primary contact bearing 230/5.1NM RWY 24 in use. REA7EN departing	Traffic info and early right turn given and taken off noise abatement	More than likely clutter
14-002	06.02.14			Pop up primary track 2 o'clock, 1 NM	Avoiding action turn 190deg	possible clutter
14-003	06.02.14			Primary track 10 o'clock 2.5nm	agreed reduced deconfliction minima	possible clutter
14-004	08.02.14 0935			Primary track 8 NNE pop up	Avoiding action LT 100 deg	possible clutter
14-005	08.02.14 0955			Primary track 8 NNE	Avoiding action LT 120 deg	possible clutter
14-006	08.02.14 1020			Dep pop up primary 5nm SW	avoiding action LT 210 deg	possible clutter
14-007	08.02.14 1027			Dep pop up primary 6nm SW	avoiding action LT 110 deg	possible clutter
14-008	08.02.14 1345			Prim track 9NNE pop up	traffic info, a/c passed	possible clutter
14-009	09.02.14			Unknown PSR rtn 8 miles	Broken off approach	
14-010	09.02.14			Hdg120 towards saber PSR rtn pop up. 3 other unknown at bradwell bay	avoiding action given	
14-011	10.02.14			due radar clutter avoiding action vectors given on unknown PSR contacts	Service reduced	A lot of clutter 6-12 miles NE. Making 5 mile deconfliction impossible
14-012	13.02.14 0738			Thames released on DEP only to 3000ft	Requested 4000' once airborne. Denied as thames had EGLC traffic inbounds to 4000' through overhead.	Acft transferred to Thames OCAS at their request. There was no operational need to restrict the southend DEP or descend the EGLC inbound.

14-013	14.02.14 0824		Thames released "gate 3". Thames would not give climb above 3 but would not provide DS to EZY. 4000' then given but this was remanding OCAS.	HDG155 off rwy06. Climb given to 4000'. Pilot explained that Thames would not give DS or higher. Pilot wanted to stay with Southend to limit of our cover. Thames then rang with 6000', as nothing seen to effect, put over to Thames climbing to 6000' hdg 155	
14-014	05.03.14 1605		NE of EGMC 8 miles tracked 5NM North of EGMC west bound.	BPK PDR given straight ahead on dep in order to give separation. Blind calls made, not on frequency. climb to 4.0 by Thames	after blind calls were made. EGLF asked to tell pilot to call in future
14-015	05.03.14		2 U/K PSR 6 + 5 miles West Appeared.	Deconfliction advice given and EZY turned off noise.	
14-016	06.03.14		2 U/K PSR 8 + 10 NE and 1 U/K PSR 5 NE.	Agreed reduced deconfliction minima and vectored wide RB. Traffic 5 NE called and REA elected to continue	
14-017	06.03.14		Inbound via TRIPO U/K PSR to the NE of the AD by approx 13NM on the TRIPO/RIDLEY track	Avoiding action given HDG 295 until CDC then closed LLZ from North. Initial HDG change given inside CAS after coordination with Thames as point of conflict would have been just when AC leaving CAS.	
14-018	06.03.14 2122		Inbound from 5 to RIDLEY U/K PSR SE of AD by 7NM.	Avoiding action given onto HDG 040, circuit widened until COC.	
14-019	07.03.14		DEP RWY 24 U/K PSR approx 7NM SE of AD.	A/C turned onto HDG 125 of noise abatement passing approx 2A when turned left.	
14-020	07.03.14		U/K traffic 7 orbiting NE of SEN.	Due to U/K AC carrying out high energy manoeuvres between 8-12NM NE, REA given re-route as unable to accept less than 5NM deconfliction minima. Believed to be a Strikemaster from EGSX	
14-021	12.03.14		U/K fast moving PSR ONLY FROM egxS DIRECTION abeam Maldon towards Dengie	Blind TX made and deconfliction advice given to RE. Blind tx on status of Danger areas given	Not within 5 miles of REA but extra workload monitoring due speed and lack of ALT.
14-022	14.03.14	GATE 3000FT	U/K PSR track seen to pass stoke NW bound, slow moving.	Avoiding action turn 090 given to EZY once inside CAS turn back to 125 deg given.	Passed 2.5 miles away whilst entering CAS at 3.5
14-023	19.03.14		U/K contact, intermittent Mode C intermittent transponder maneuvering on a 8-12 mile final, no RT.	DWRH for an SRA given shorter pattern on TI and on a TS	U/K was JPRO Phoned subsequently
14-024	20.03.14		Released by Thames 3.0ft will call back for higher	No contact from Thames. ACFT hdg to DET inbound to KA. Called and disconnected. Given through gate on next call. U/K prevented this over Sheppey, EZY vectored N of TFC climb 6.0 given by Thames eventually and kept until passing 5500.	needless situation if Thames had specified through the gate on initial release
14-025	24.03.14		Seen to drop out of CAS at 4.0 and continue E bound twrds CLN release was SABER 4.	Phone TC NE and requested transfer did not occur until at CLN on HDG 090. CFE ACFT on CLN from LCY seen at EZY was vectored around until U/K was clear. Joined back to the ILS from the North. Extra Workload none required	
14-026	26.03.14 1210		Inbound EZY SMD 4A with U/K PSR OPR Stoke St Mary's and passed through 7 mile final final rwy 06 in use	observed Mode 5 N 1.5-2.0A tracking SW. Crossed final app at 8NM 2.2A not talking to Radar.	
14-027	28.03.14		observed Mode 5 N 1.5-2.0A tracking SW. Crossed final app at 8NM 2.2A not talking to Radar.	2X U/K TFC opr SW of SEN. One maneuvering at 5nm - no RT and TMS listening squawk.	EZY vectored via SMD at 4 then positioned DWLH06
14-028	11.04.14 1050		Various U/K at 5NM and W of SMD. REA vectored East of Sen then RH RWY 06. not communicating with Sen transit N to S passing through 3.5NM final RWY 06.	REA vectored East of MC by 6.5NM then had to be extended 10NM SW of MC and taken through LLZ to establish from the North at 6NM.	Increased workload and delayed behind.
14-029	18.04.14 1343		2X RV6 AEROBATICS 8NE TO 8NW VARIOUS LEVELS NOT ON FREQ	WORKLOAD INCREASED	REA additional track miles (approx 20NM) and then taken through LLZ
14-030	17.05.14		#7000 1500FT TRACKED THROUGH OVERHEAD EAST TO WEST NOT ON FREQ	REA HELD ON GROUND UNTIL TWR HAD REA AND TFC IN SIGHT. DELAY APPROX 5 MINS.	FORMATION ANNOUNCED INTENTIONS AND LEAVING FREQUENCY AT SAME TIME
14-031	08.06.14				TOWER ADVISED UNKNOWN AS A GYROCOPTER
14-032	12.06.14		U/K TFC (PSR) SOUTH OF 4NM FINAL RWY 06 SLOWLY TRACKING SOUTHBOUND FROM DET	EZY VECTORED THROUGH FAT. LEFT TURN BACK ONTO ILS!	EZY GIVEN TI AND ADVISED OF PLAN TO TAKE THROUGH FAT TO CLOSE FROM NORTH BUT THEN ASKED FOR MORE TRACK MILES SO GIVEN 360 THEN LEFT TURN BACK ONTO LLZ. SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN WORKLOAD AS 5 A/C BEING VECTORED (4 INBOUND 1 INST) AND REA WAITING TO DEP
14-033	15.06.14		2X U/K #7000 FLT THROUGH 6.5NM FINAL 06 SE TO NW AT 1700FT	ACFT DID NOT CALL	NO TRAFFIC DIRECTLY AFFECTED. 2X LIGHT ACFT ON FREQ. HAD LESS THAN OPTIMUM TFC PASSED.
14-034	17.06.14		OBSERVED FLYING THROUGH FINAL APP RWY 06 AT 2.0 INDICATED NOT LISTENING OUT ON RADAR OR DIRECTOR	REA GIVEN AT LEAST 20 EXTRA TRACK MILES. AVOIDING ACTION TAKEN THROUGH LLZ TO S THEN BACK THROUGH LLZ TO NORTH	FURTHER REA TRAFFIC FROM CLN SLOWED DOWN TO BE DEQUENCED BEHIND. IF MORE TRAFFIC, COULD HAVE BEEN VERY DIFFICULT
14-035	18.06.14		FLEW THROUGH AN 8NM SW BOUND INDICATING 2000FT. EZY INBOUND VIA DET FOR RWY 06. AT ST MARYS MARSH	KEPT THE EZY AT 4000FT AND VECTORED APPROX 10 EXTRA TRACK MILES TO AVOID TFC AND LOSE HEIGHT FOR THE ILS 06. PHONED LONDON INFO STRAIGHT AWAY TO ASK THEM TO TRANSFER OVER A/C	GCDTA INFORMS HE SPOKE TO LONDON INFO TO ACTIVATE FPL TO EHMZ. ASKED PILOT POLITELY TO GIVE US A CALL ON THAT TRACK OUT OF EGML UNTIL PASSED OUT FINAL APPROACH!!
14-036	19.06.14		FLYING OVER BURNHAM AT 1800 SW BOUND NOT ON FREQ	3 BLIND CALLS PUT OUT, ON ON FREQ. EZY DELAYED ON GROUND BY 2 MIN	
14-037	28.06.14		SEEN Q OF CLN HDG 170 INDICATING 2000FT+	AVOIDING TURN GIVEN TO REA (FROM EAST) TO 330. THEN TURNED HDG 140 AND CONTINUED TO CLIMB. BLIND CALLS PUT OUT TO NO RESPONSE. REA TOLD TO EXPEDITE DESCENT TO 2000 TO INCREASE VERTICAL SEPN	SITUATION EXAGGERATED BY REA WANTING WX AVOIDING AT SAME TIME AS TFC AVOIDANCE NEEDED IN OPPOSITE DIRECTION
14-038	07.07.14		8NM/STOKE MODE S NO CONTACT	BEE HELD AT 4000FT (NO THAMES TRAFFIC TO AFFECT) UNTIL NORTH OF SHEERNESS	TRIED BLIND TXS
14-039	07.07.14		8NM/STOKE MODE S NO CONTACT		
14-040	15.07.14 0612		LEFT CAS AT 5000 HDG 135 THROUGH THAMES GATE		THAMES RADAR/TC SE DID NOT CLIMB EZY IN TIME. OCAS FOR APPROX 5 MILES (EGLC/EGSS TFC AT 6+7)
14-041	15.07.14 0711	CLN PDR RWY 24	THAMES WOULD NOT GIVE CLIMB ABOVE 3A ONCE AIRBORNE	ACFT TRANSFERRED TO T.R AT 3000' AS NO TFC OCAS SEEN TO AFFECT. TR THEN IMMEDIATELY CLIMBED TO 5000'	NEAREST TFC BCY ON CLN SID FROM EGLC ALREADY AT 5000'+, 8NM NE OF REA
14-042	03.08.14		NOT REPLYING TO ATC CALLS		EEZ RMZ FOLDER AS WELL PILOT DIFFERENT INTERPRETATION OF RMZ RULES
14-043	15.08.14		U/K CONTACT OUT OF STOKE NON-TRANSPONDER TRACKING SOUTH WITH EZY RI 06	KEPT EZY AT 4000FT AND VECTORED AROUND CONTACT TO ALLOW DESCENT FOR VECTORS ILS 06	EZY ENDED UP DOING 10 EXTRA TRACK MILES
14-044	15.08.14 1153		ENTERED RMZ WITHOUT CALLING ROUTING HANINGFIELD TO FINALS 06.	ALMOST HAD TO BREAK THE EZY BUT TURNED AWAY AT LAST MINUTE	RMZ INFRINGEMENT FORM COMPLETED
14-045	15.08.14 1700		OPR 5NM TRANSFERRED TO 128.950 FROM RAD BUT DID NOT TRANSFER AND BECAME U/K. ALTHOUGH TRAFFIC INFO HAD BEEN PASSED UNABLE TO PROVIDE 5NM ONCE CONTACT LOST SO AVOIDING ACTION GIVEN TO STK AND AC BROKEN OFF APPROACH. FURTHER U/K TRAFFIC ABEAM STOKE	BLIND TX'S AND AVOIDING ACTION GIVEN. STOKE TRAFFIC ROUTED EAST OF ILSE OF GRAIN.	CLASS D BOTH WOULD HAVE HAD TRAFFIC INFO. STOKE TRAFFIC MEANT EXTRA 8 MILES AND EXTRA CORD WITH THAMES REQUIRED.
14-046	24.08.14		DEP RWY 06 180 6A INFRINGED RMZ TRACKING SE BOUND	NONE - MONITORED	STK ENTERED CAS BEFORE THE NEED TO TAKE AVOIDING ACTION A/C CAME WITHIN 6NM OF EACHOTHER. IF STK DEP 2MIN LATER AVOIDING ACTION WOULD HAVE BEEN NEEDED TO THE E AND A/C WOULD HAVE LEFT CAS
14-047	24.08.14		2 A/C ON FREQ INBOUND TO STOKE BUT DID NOT WANT A SERVICE INSIDE RMZ (#7000 1XPDR)		
14-048	24.08.14		NON SSR FROM STOKE/STOKE		UNABLE TO IDENT DUE PSR RTN. THEREFORE DEPS ON DS NOT POSSIBLE 24
14-049	26.08.14		PRIMARY CONTACTS IN RMZ POSSIBLY CLUTTER?	AVOIDING ACTION/ EXTRA TRACK MILES	BOTH BELIEVED TO BE CLUTTER
14-050	27.08.14		REQ A4 DET 350 THAMES ADVISED HAVE TO DESCEND TO A3 TO POCAS	ROUTE TO SMD A3 TO AVOID U/K IN VICINITY OF DET. COORD WITH LF NOT ABOVE A2 TRAFFIC 125W SE BOUND	AGAINST TRAFFIC VISIBLE RMA AT A4
14-051	28.08.14		REQ DET SMD A4 THAMES NOT ABLE ONLY A3 AVBL	REQ A4 UNTIL AFTER DET DUE U/K. ADVISED ONLY IF REMAIN AT A4 THEN WOULD BE DET L OR R. AGREED AFTER PASSING DET A3.	LOTS OF REQ AND COORD WITH THAMES TO STAY INSIDE. NO OTHER A/C IN RMA OBSERVED.
14-052	28.08.14		REQ DET SMD A4 THAMES NOT ABLE ONLY A3 AVBL	REQ HDG 015 BEFORE REACHING DET DUE U/K A/C	
14-053	30.08.14		LOST 2 WAY THROUGH HRMZ UNTIL LEAVING RMZ CROSSING CLIMB OUT RWY 24	MULTIPLE BLIND TX'S HELD STK CLN GROUND	6-7 MIN DELAY CAS WOULD REQUIRE A CLEARANCE THROUGH RMZ ONLY REQD 2-WAY CONTACT
14-054	31.08.14		ENTERED RMZ WITH NO CONTACT EGSX-LFAT AT 2A ON LF SQUAWK	STK RELEASE DELAYED BY 1.5 MINS UNTIL CONTACT ESTABLISHED AND THEN AMENDED STRAIGH AHEAD (INSTEAD OF THROUGH THE GATE)	PILOT NOT WARNED BY LF OF RMZ BOUNDARY. PILOT SHOULD HAVE CALLED.
14-055	31.08.14		ESTPK ENTERED RMZ FRM WEST NO R/T	ON FIRST CALL TO RADAR COORD NO LEFT TURNS AND NOT ABOVE A2 EZY98DG GIVEN S/A 4A BECAUSE OF INFRINGER	LATE TRANSFER FROM EGLF LARS
14-056	03.09.14		OUTBOUND PLAISTOW TO HB WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY TURNS FOR IDENT BS ONLY 1500. RWY 06 IN USE EZY INBOUND VIA DET AND STK INBOUND VIA TRIPO.	VECTORED EZY OVER THE TOP FOR D/W L/H 06	LOW TRAFFIC
14-057	03.09.14		INFRINGED RMZ IN ST MARY'S MARSH VICINITY WHILST STK VECTORED FOR RWY 06	TRAFFIC INFO STK HAPPY TO CONTINUE	ENTERED RMZ 1448 LEFT 1507 PILOT ASKED TO CONTACT ATC THROUGH EGTO ON CONTACTING ATC VIA TELEPHONE PILOT ADVISED HE HAD UNDERCARRIAGE ISSUES ON DEP FROM EGTO AND WAS CONCENTRATING ON RESOLVING THE ISSUE BEFORE REALIZING HIS POSITION. PROMPTLY LEFT AND LANDED EGTO.
14-058	04.09.14		MICROLITE OPR OUT OF EGTO 5NM 2 WAY CONTACT BUT NOT IDENT	INCREASED TRACK MILES THROUGH OVERHEAD	MASSIVE INCREASE IN WORKLOAD
14-059	07.09.14		STOW MARIES FLY IN MULTIPLE AIRCRAFT IN VICINITY OF SOUTHEND		INCREASED WORKLOAD APPROXIMATELY 20-30 A/C
14-060	13.09.14		UNKNOWN A/C SW OF RMZ MANOUEVERING	EZY FROM THE SOUTH VECTORED TO AVOID - LHAND CIRCUIT RWY 06	A/C IN RMZ NOT IN R/T CONTACT ENSURED I/B EZY HAD SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN TRACK MILES
14-061	14.09.14		POP UP PRIMARY 3NM SW TRACKING TOWARDS FINAL APPROACH, STK ESTABLISHED ILS 6NM	STK BROKEN OFF ILS AVOIDING ACTION TAKEN	POSSIBLY CLUTTER AS FADED FROM RADAR UNTIL A/C LANDED
14-062	14.09.14		D/W RIGHT AT 3A DECONFLICTED WITH N/W A/C ON FINAL APPROACH. UNKNOWN A/C ENTERS RMZ FROM SOUTH INDICATING A2 HEADING TOWARDS 5 MILE FINAL	STK GIVEN AVOIDING ACTION HEADING 260 DEGREES, THEN 330 DEGREES.	A/C SUBSEQUENTLY CALLS RADAR WHEN 3NM INSIDE RMZ. COORDINATED NOT ABOVE A2 STK VECTORED DW A3.
14-063	14.09.14		UNKNOWN PSR N OF DET. EZY TRACKING A4 DET TO AVOID UNKNOWN PSR 10NM NW A/C	VECTORED TO 5NM FINAL 06	A/C SWITCHED ON MODE S A/C 12.5W AND SQUAWK APPEAR.
14-064	15.09.14	06 DEP	STOMP CRUISER, EZY LINED UP 1819, EZY DEPARTED 1829	DELAYED DEP AS A/C WOULD NOT MOVE W/A	IT WAS GETTING DARK, LAST RADAR CONTACT NE TRACKING NORTH

14-065	19.09.14			THAMES RANG TO COORDINATE TRAFFIC THROUGH RMZ THAT THEY WERE WORKING AND TO CLIMB INTO CAS. THEN TRANSFERRED TO SOUTHEND BECAUSE OF THIS.		NEED PROCEDURES WORKED OUT HOW TO HANDLE AIRWAYS JOINING FOR OTHER AIRCRAFT.
14-066	19.09.14		#2064	ENTERED RMZ AT 3100' CLIMBING ENROUTE CAS AT 3500 WHEN 8 MILES W OF EGMC		
14-067	19.09.14			A/C 6W CLN #7000, DELAYED DESCENT OF EZY FROM ARRIVES/EHAM, 6400' EZY WAS THEN REDIRECTED NW BY THAMES TO FACILITATE DESCENT BY ADDING 7 EXTRA MILES.	TFC POINTED OUT TO THAMES IN RELEVANT MESSAGES AND SAID NOT TO DESCEND UNTIL CLER OF IT. EZY WAS TRACKED ON HDG THAT WAS NO COORDINATED AS RESULT (240 DEGREES INSTEAD OF 265 DEGREES).	WITH CAS THE #7000 WOULD HAVE BEEN KNOWN TFC AND EZY SO NO EXTRA MILES WOULD HAVE BEEN MADE
14-068	21.09.14			BLADES ANNOUNCED THEY HAD TO GO NON RADIO IN RMZ (BASILDON). NO RADIO FOR 20 MINS FORMATION OF 4 EXTRAS EGOW	DIRECTOR HAD TO CHANGE DIRECTION OF CIRCUIT FOR ARRIVAL FROM NE FM LH TO RH, EXTRA WORKLOAD, AND WAS NOT TO HAPPY WITH INABILITY TO CO-ORDINATE THE AIRCRAFT AS OFF FREQUENCY. I WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE COMPREHENSIVE BS TO OTHER AIRCRAFT BECAUSE OF THIS. BS TERMINATED TO BLADES	I WAS NOT AWARE OF THIS PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF DISPLAY AT LOCATION. COMPOUNDED WITH AN RMZ INFRINGEMENT BY YKII THOUGH THE AREA OF THE BLADES, WORKLOAD FOR ATC WAS MASSIVELY INCREASED AT VERY SHORT NOTICE
14-069	23.09.14			GLIDER OPERATING 8NM SW ON CLIMBOUT BETWEEN 2.0 & 2.5A	INTERMITTENT CONTACT AND COMMUNICATION WITH RAD2. EZY GIVEN AVOIDING ACTION ONTO 330 DEG JUST INSIDE 2.5NM ON CLIMBOUT TO AVOID APPROX 5NM	DUE TO LATE CALL TO DIRECTOR ON DEP & RE-APPEARANCE OF PRIMARY CONATCT - AVOIDING ACTION TURN DEEMED APPROPRIATE
14-070	09.10.14			UNNECESSARY RESTRICTION FROM THAMES RADAR RESULTING IN INCREASED WORKLOAD FOR TWR ATCO, PILOT AND RADAR ATCO. RESTRICTION TO 3000'	TWR REVISED DECREASE TO STOP AT 3A. RDR PHONED TR ONCE AIRBORNE. AGAIN A RESTRICTION 'ONCE TURNED TO CLN' CLIMB TO FL60 ISSUED	AT THAT TIME OF DAY, NO SAFETY ISSUE AT ALL, HOWEVER ON A BUSY VFR DAY COULD CAUSE UNNECESSARY PROBLEMS.
14-071	13.10.14			THAMES UNABLE TO GIVE 4000' ON A BPK DUE SLOW LCY DVR CLIMBER DUE LCY 'SHORT-CUT' TRAFFIC AT LAM AT 4000' INBOUND FOR LCY		IF TC HAD NOE BEEN PRIORITISING CITY TRAFFIC FOR SHORT-CUTS, WE COULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CLIMB STK INTO SAFETY OF CAS EASIER. ENTERED CAS NORTH OF RMZ BOUNDARY (PILOT HAD WX AVOIDANCE ISSUES TOO)
14-072	16.10.14			THAMES REFUSED TO GIVE 4000' 'NEGATIVE, NOT AVAILABLE'. ONLY THING SEEN TO AFFECT WAS A SWR OUTBOUND EGLC 30->60 EASTBOUND TOWARDS OUR OVERHEAD, THEN SOUTH EASTBOUND		BY THE TIME STK WAS HEADED TO EVNAS THE SWR WAS ->45. THE PILOT WAS HAPPY TO GO TO TCNE AT 3A, AND FORTUNATELY NOTHING OUTSIDE CAS AT EVNAS
14-073	20.10.14			CLN. THAMES RELEASED TO 3A ONLY. THEN GAVE -> 4A SUBJECT TO TFC IN O/H (RELUCTANTLY) AS EZY PHONED THAMES TO STOP AT 3A SO THAT THEY COULD GIVE A SHORT-CUT TO A LCY LAM INBOUND (I)	EZY STOPPED OFF AT 3 & SUBSEQUENTLY CLIMBED TO 4 WHEN TR ALLOWED	IF EZY HAD BEEN LEFT ON CLN PDR, SEPERATION WOULD HAVE BEEN M7 ALL ALONG ON BOTH OTHER THAMES ACFT. UNNECESSARY INCREASE IN ATC AND PILOT WORKLOAD
14-074	24.10.14			LYD PDR. RELEASED (AFTER 3 MIN DELAY) TO 3A GATE. WAS NOT CLIMBED FOR APPROX 12 MILES AFTER TRANSFER TO THAMES		UNNECESSARY RISK THROUGH INCREASED AND UNNECESSARY EXPOSURE OUTSIDE CAS DUE DESCENDING ALL LCY I/B TO 5000' EARLY, AND THEN NOT ABLE TO CLIMB LCY DVR DEPARTURES ABOVE 4000' AS WELL.
14-075	2.11.14			LYD PDR. RELEASED GATE 3A, THAMES WHEN ASKED FOR CLIMB "GIVE IT TO ME, I'LL SORT IT OUT", WAS CLIBED ALMOST IMMEDIATELY BY THAMES		
14-076	19.11.14			RWY DVR PDR. THAMES SAID WOULD PHONE BACK WHEN AIRBORNE TO GET HIGHER. PHONED BACK AND SAID TRANSFER OUTSIDE	STK ADVISED NOTHING SEEN & TRANSFERRED TO THAMES	THAMES PRIORITISING EGLC TFC OVER GIVING ON TRACK & DESCENT CLIMB T MC TFC
14-077	10.12.14			LEFT CAS SE OF MC (HDG 125 THAMES GATE)		LCY O/B TFC NOT CLIMBED FM 6, PREVENTED CLIMB ON SRK1LC DUE LCY I/B TFC ->5000' IN OVR.
14-078	10.12.14			CPT	THAMES COULDN'T CLIMB DUE TFC UNTIL OUTSIDE RMZ. THEN LATE TRANSFER TO TC NE (HDG CORDIANTED)	
14-079	13.12.14			CPT PDR - RCVD TCAS ON C152 MANOURVERING AT HFD (WELL SOUTH)	THAMES DID NOT GIVE CLIMB ABOVE 3A. THIS RESULTED IN HURRIED RE-PLAN WITH RADAR AND EZY RCVD TCAS ON C152 SF HFD AS IT TURNED E (GHFOT 3000') SEEN ERODED TO 3NM	THAMES EGLC DEP ON DVR. LARGE AMOUNT OF COMPLICATING GA ALSO PRESENT
14-080	23.12.14			LYD PDR GIVEN GATE 3 & THEN GATE 5	TRANSFERRED TO THAMES INSIDE CAS HDG 125, ACFT CLIMBED TO 6000' AND THEN LEFT CAS JUST EAST OF CANTERBURY AGAIN AT 6000', STLL HDG 135. TURNED AT CLIMBED BY TCSE WHEN THEY REALISED, NO TFC TO REACT EARLIER	
15-001	01.01.15			INBOUND RELEASE COORDINATED RIDLY 4000'. THAMES PHONED BACK AND SAID THEY HAD TO DESCEND TO 3000' (OCAS)	NO TRAFFIC TO AFFECT OCAS	EXTRA TRACK MILES INSIDE CAS. UNNECESSARY AS COULD ROUTED MORE DIRECT MUCH EARLIER OCAS. THAMES RANG UP TO DET TURNING TO RIDLEY WITH NO REAL TRAFFIC TO EFFECT. DVR - RIDLEY
15-002	02.01.15			INBOUND RELEASE COORDINATED RIDLEY 4000'. ACFT SEEN TO DESCEND THROUGH 3000' AFTER CALLING EGMC	NO TRAFFIC TO EFFECT OCAS	THAMES RADAR REPORT CONTROLLER INVOLVED HAD JUST GONE ON A BREAK
15-003	09.01.15			COORDINATED RIDLY 4. TR THEN PHONED BACK AGAIN AND SAID WOULD HAVE TO BE AT 3 DUE TRAFFIC UNABLE TO CLIMB LCY O/B FROM 4		TR UNABLE TO CLIMB LCY O/B BECAUSE THEY HAD SPEAR INBOUNDS TO 5000' WHEN THEY COULD HAVE ONLY DESCENDED TO 6000' (NO TFC BEHIND)
15-004	13.02.15			PRIMARY CONTACT OBSERVED OSEA ISLAND	AVOIDING ACTION 180 DEG	POSSIBLY CLUTTER

TC RELEASE DELAYS (5 or more minutes)

Date	Time of call	PDR	Release Time	Delay	Aircraft	Comments
26/11/2013	0754	CPT	0759	5	EZY31GL	2X EGLC CLN'S (1 ALREADY AIRBOURNE)
27/11/2013	1906	BPK	1912	6	EZY52KG	2X EGLC CLN'S
27/11/2013	1913	BPK	1916	3	EZY719	2X EGLC CLN'S (CALLED BACK AND SUGGESTED 360 CLIMB 3.0 AS NO SIGN OF LCY DEP AND ONE ON FINAL @ LCY. CFE8493 SEEN DEP AT 1917. TC NE CALLED - CLIMB TO 7.0 @1920 (DEP 1918)
28/11/2013	1910	BPK	1918	8	EZY52KG	LCY CLN DEP
29/11/2013	1918	BPK	1929	11	EZY52KG	WAITING 2X LCY CLN DEPS
04/12/2013	1909	BPK	1918	9	EZY719	2X LCY CLN DEP
04/12/2013	1927	CPT	1939	12	REA9EN	2X LCY DEP - FOLLOW UP CAL 1936. NO STRIPS AND HANDOVER. THEN SAID WAITING FOR 2 LCY DEPS! CONFIRMED CFE8493 CONFLICTING (3RD CLN DE) - SAID YES. (PREVIOUS CLN CFE19A AND SUS12)
05/12/2013	1922	CPT	1927	5	REA9EN	CITY DEP (DVR) + G/A AT EGLC?
06/12/2013	0741	CPT	0748	7	TWF75	LCY dep
06/12/2013	1909	BPK	1914	5	EZY719	LCY CLN dep
06/12/2013	1918	BPK	1923	5	REA9EN	Suggested 010 DEG 3000' - Released to remain outside CAS.
08/12/2013	1926	BPK	1932	6	EZY52KG	2X LCY CLN dep
09/12/2013	0920	CPT	0925	5	REA1EN	1X LCY CLN
12/12/2013	0952	BPK	?	>10	ENZ412P	2X LCY CLN - Advised min. 5 Mins.- Called after 11 Mins, no details. Told Thames revised entry - Pilot elected to go outside. ? Further 10-15 min. delay (positioning into EGWU)
12/12/2013	1835	CLN	1843	8	EZY7373	Due Runway change at City!!
12/12/2013	1911	BPK	1916	5	EZY719	2x LCY Dep
12/12/2013	1911	BPK	1916	5	EZY52KG	2X LCY CLN Dep
12/12/2013	1927	BPK	1937	10	REA9EN	Stated 1 CLN off City. Controller changed and at 5 Mins said was waiting for the last City CLN Dep to get airborne. SUSI2/CFE8493/CFE19A.I Phoned 3rd time (at 10 min. delay), 3rd Controller just taken over & knew nothing about it waiting for release and gave it immediately.
13/12/2013	1306	LYD	1314	8	EZY58YE	Due outbound LCY traffic at a guess. No reason given.
13/12/2013	1906	CPT	1913	7	MCD057	Due outbound LCY traffic
13/12/2013	1921	BPK	1927	6	EZY719	BCY58D off EGLC on CLN SID. No reason given by TC.
18/12/2013	1906	BPK	1910	4		TCNE (will call right back - no reason given) BCY85D on CLN + SUS12
19/12/2013	1910	BPK	1920	10	EZY52KG	WX (SOMETHING). Because of EZY52KG delay, request for EZY719 was whilst pushing back, so in reality was ready for departure at 1913.
19/12/2013	1910	BPK	1923	13	EZY719	Same as above
30/12/2013	1632	CPT	1634	2	EZY49YC	No strips when called for release
31/12/2013	0937	BPK	0944	2	REA1EN	2 LC Deps. 1 already A/B (2nd LC dep through 5.0) reminder call??
03/01/2014	1217	CPT	1222	5	EZY7441	"will call back" no reason although wx poor + BCY229 observed on CLN from LC. Wx avoidance?
03/01/2014	1917	BPK	1925	8	EZY719	LCY CLN DEP

TC RELEASE DELAYS (5 or more minutes)

06/01/2014		1758	BPK	1802	4	REA7EN	LCY CLN DEP
07/01/2014		0752	CPT	0757	5	EZY31GC	No strip
07/01/2014		1224	CPT	1232	8	EZY7441	City positioner EGSS-EGLC airborne SS climbing 4.0. Clearence actually given not above 3.0
09/01/2014		0756	CPT	0801	5	EZY316C	LC Dep
10/01/2014		1931	BPK	1940	9	REA9EN	City Dep
?		1902	BPK	1907	5	EZY52KG	CITY DEP
17/01/2014		1911	BPK	1918	7	EZY52KG	2X EGLC DEPS
17/01/2014		1930	BPK	1937	7	REA9EN	EGLC DEP
17/01/2014		2033	BPK	2040	7	ICE6045	LCY CLN DEP (BCY89D)
22/01/2014		1022	LYD	none	none	EZY43TK	Release gate A3 only, CFE8456 4NE SND @5 Then cleared to A4?
22/01/2014		1901	BPK	1908	7	EZY52KG	CITY DEP
22/01/2014		1917	BPK	1924	7	REA9EN	CITY DEPS
23/01/2014		1911	BPK	1918	7	EZY52KG	1X CITY CLN
23/01/2014		1916	CPT	1926	10	REA9EN	1X CITY CLN tried to coordinate 360 3A but was told 'no'. Subsequently released 360 3A.
27/01/2014		1035	CLN	1040	5	EZY7429	Delayed by Thames, decended CFE8496 to 5000ft 12 NE EGMC and then to 4000 fm overhead. Would only release at 1040 to 3000ft. Subsequently released EZY43TK 'LYD 4000FT' and then decended LGL in o/h to 4000ft (LGL93E)
29/01/2014		1931	BPK	1937	6	REA9EN	Several City Deps
30/01/2014		1912	BPK	1918	6	EZY52KG	Clity DEP. CFE @Chelmsford passing FL84. SUS12 N of EGMC @4000ft when EZY52KG released??
03/02/2014		1928	BPK	1935	7	REA9EN	1 CITY DEP
05/02/2014		0800	CPT	0805	5	EZY31GC	2X LCY CLN dep. However TCNE and Thames both pro-active in getting in good climb once released against traffic.
10/02/2014		1950	BPK	2000	10	REA9EN	CFE39V inbound to LCY via LAM from NW - no reason given.
13/02/2014		0848	BPK	0857	9	ENZ513	Stated would be a few minutes due to a few EGLC deps. Only one dep (BCY87MK), which still prevented release at 5 mins. delay.
13/02/2014		1633	BPK	1644	11	REA7EN	Told 2 mins delay (3 EGSSS departures observed)
14/02/2014		1945	BPK	2016	31	REA9EN	Major WX delays. TC advised MC unknown delay due diversions - exceptional circumstance due WX
16/02/2014		1922	BPK	1933	11	REA9EN	Due 2X LCY Deps
17/02/2014		1952	BPK	1958	6	HYR60A	2X LCY Deps
27/02/2014		0805	CPT	0810	5	EZY31GC	Will phone back in couple of minutes; phoned back after CFE26N on CLN off LCY had passed 4A climbing
28/02/2014		1843	CLN	1851	8	EZY7373	THAMES - LCY 'issues' unable to give any release?
06/03/2014		1951	CPT	1958	7	MCD079	Due LCY DEPS
07/03/2014		1913	BPK	1921	8	EZY52KG	Due LCY DEPS
11/03/2014		0802	CPT	0807	5	EZY31GC	2X LCY CLN DEPS
11/03/2014		0802	BPK	0808	6	TWF52	2X LCY CLN DEPS
13/03/2014		1927	CPT	1933	6	REA9EN	Offered remain outside CAS only, which pilot accepted. Apparently this was due to LCY DEPS but unknown as to why they could not coordinate HDG and climb with us. REA9EN climbed immediately to ALT6000 when on their frequency.

TC RELEASE DELAYS (5 or more minutes)

18/03/2014		0843	CPT	0850	7	EZY31GC	WEIGHT OF TRAFFIC
20/03/2014		0916	BPK	0921	5	REA1EN	DUE EGLC O/B ON CLN (BCY205 was out of FL070 climbing when REA1EN released.
21/03/2014		1910	BPK	1916	6	EZY52KG	2X EGLC DEPS, not stated
01/04/2014		1236	CPT	1244	8	EZY65AW	No reason given initially, subsequent call due EGLC traffic (Rwy 06)
04/04/2014		1838	BPK	1844	6	EZY87DV	Due LCY DEPS
04/04/2014		1844	BPK	1856	12	REA9EN	Due LCY DEPS
12/04/2014		1023	BPK	1028	5	REA03EN	BUSY
15/04/2014		0556	CPT	0600	4	EZY26ME	Will have to call back (after shuttles) no traffic delay
25/04/2014	JP	1840	BPK	1846	6	EZY87DV	No call back so called them and suggested 360 3A and agreed when airbourne TC called back 360 8A
30/04/2014	TC	1002	BPK	1010	8	REA03EN	1st call - call you back 2nd call (4mins) not long now. 3rd call (8mins) just had to wait for BCY8N to get through 4A was at 4500 at that time.
14/05/2014		1853	BPK	1900	7	EZY87DV	Due LCY DEPS
22/05/2014	MA	0840	BPK	0846	6	REA1EN	LCY DEP
22/05/2014	MA	1206	CLN	1222	16	EZY47CD	EGMC-EDDB rwy 06 in use due holding TFC/ Incident at Biggin/ Thames overloaded
22/05/2014	MA	1210	SAM	1233	23	BEE9MN	EGMC-EGHQ rwy 06 in use due holding TFC/ Incident at Biggin/ Thames overloaded
23/05/2014	JG	0607	LYD	0617	10	EZY24LG	Will call back EJM30 DVR delayed also as consequence
23/05/2014	JG	0607	DVR	0622		EJM30	Released 0622 #2 to EZY24LG 3A DET
23/05/2014	JG	1201	CPT	1209	8	EZY69GD	2 opposite direction' stated by NE
25/05/2014	RL	1148	CPT	1158	10	EZY69GD	
27/05/2014	TC	1905	BPK	1912	7	REA9EN	EGLC CLN DEP
06/06/2014	SJ	0605	LYD	0605	0	EZY94WB	Given 3A 180 no further climb given told transfer to 132.7 nothing seen to affect climb to 4A
06/06/2014	SJ	0609	LYD	0611	2	EZY24LG	Given 3A 180 again nothing seen to affect 4 but given 4 when airbourne.
07/06/2014	SJ	0935	LYD	0935	0	EZY53LX	A/C released 'through the gate 3A' when airbourne phoned for further climb which was refused. No reason seen on radar. No A/C within 10NM. Told to pass him to Thames towards gate 3A.
08/06/2014	JGW	1845	BPK	1857	12	REA9EN	Multiple CLN deps. NE could not release. Delay affected EZY7405 and EZY87DV
15/06/2014	TC	1431	LYD	1438	7	REA622R	Thames workload. Aircraft lined up RWY06, caused more work
15/06/2014	TC	1442	BPK	1447	5	REA7EN	TCNE due EGLC dep
19/06/2014	MA	1407	BPK	1416	9	LNK41RS	TC NE - due 'dilemma' at WGGE was given reason. LNK inbound EGGW on a BPK
20/06/2014	MA	0831	BPK	0837	6	REA1EN	TC NE - LCY DEP
01/07/2014	TC	1543	CPT	1548	5	EZY42FL	Due LCY DEPS
21/07/2014	MM	1437	BPK	1446	9	REA7EN	Multiple LCY DEPS
24/07/2014	TC	0853	BPK	0903	10	REA1EN	LCY CLN DEP released (BCY83N)
11/08/2014	RL	1423	LYD	1438	15	STK622R	Due TC South no releases due WX
15/08/2014	RL	1746	DVR	1752	6	STK612A	Thames too busy
18/08/2014	JG	1247	BK	1257	10	LNK79PN	TCNE
27/08/2014	JG	1736	DVR	1340	4	ENZ911P	Had to orbit inbound c172 on final
31/08/2014	JP	1848	BPK	1854	6	STK9EN	LCY DEP (CLN)

TC RELEASE DELAYS (5 or more minutes)

02/09/2014	MA	0704	CLN	0709	5	STK630F	CLN PDR rwy06. Thames said they would call back. Phoned thames back after 5 mins and they released 4000' CLN. Nothing observed on Radar from NE to explain delay
02/09/2014	MA	0709	DVR	0715	6	STK60M	Asked for release at same time as phoning back for above a/c and was told they would call back again. Thames phoned back after 6 minutes and released heading 180, 3000ft only. When airborne thames phoned back and coordinated 4000'

Appendix 4: Comments from Based Operators

Stobart Air

From: Richard Hodge [<mailto:richard.hodge@stobartair.com>]

Sent: 19 September 2014 11:09

To: Sam Petrie

Subject: SEN Class D Airspace Safety Case.

Sam,

The RMZ is an improvement on the Class G airspace as it provides the requirement for traffic to contact ATC prior to entry to the zone, however, there is still the opportunity for traffic to enter the zone without prior ATC notification, affecting the various types of scheduled commercial traffic operating in the zone, as adequate separation can be provided by SEN Radar.

From a Stobart Air perspective due the number of commercial flights we operate in SEN on a daily basis and the nature of the flights we would prefer the airspace to be re-classified as Class D airspace. This provides us with the reassurance than when operating in the zone we can be sure that unidentified traffic will not pose a risk to us.

We have had a number of occurrences in the past, (if you require more explicit details I can obtain them), where controllers have issued a clearance limit to training/GA traffic in order to keep them clear of the area, but these instructions have been ignored or misunderstood resulting in a number of missed approaches in order to maintain the safety of the flight and appropriate separation. In one case we had a TCAS RA as a consequence of unidentified traffic while the aircraft was established on the ILS 06. The safety argument is clear, we intend to increase the use of SEN for our commercial operations, to do this we require controlled airspace to protect our aircraft. Safety is paramount and all the time crews are looking outside for unidentified aircraft that have been seen by ATC increases the risk to our aircraft as crews are having to work at a higher rate during an ordinarily high workload flight regime.


Commercially, the cost incurred having to take evasive headings when ATC have identified aircraft that are not under their direct control, is significant, a cost not only in fuel, but time also.

SEN ATC work to a very high standard, which is important, Class D would allow them to concentrate more on commercial traffic and less on GA traffic, this in itself is a compelling safety case.

If you have any questions, or require any further information, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Thanks,
Richard.

| Richard Hodge | Fleet Captain | Stobart Air |
| 1 Northwood Avenue, Santry, Dublin 9, Ireland |
| Tel: +353-1-8447647 | Mob: +353-86-2763935 | Fax: +353-1-8447701 |
<image007.jpg> <image008.jpg>

 Please don't print this e-mail unless you really need to

easyJet

easyJet's Safety Case for Southend

Long term solution required

The long term mitigation against airborne collision was foreseen to be the successful introduction of controlled airspace. It was expected that this would be Class D as this classification is normally used for Control Zones (CTR).

Medium term mitigation

The first interim risk mitigation was the provision of SSR/PSR with a high level of continuity through multiple layers of redundancy. The CAA Flight Operations Inspectorate showed great concerns that this could be demonstrated at the time and it became contingent for the commencement of easyJet's commercial air transport operations.

This has been supplemented since by the implementation of a Radio Mandatory Zone (RMZ). This had not been foreseen as a solution at the time of the start-up of easyJet's operations at Southend but can be seen as an added layer of risk mitigation. At no time has easyJet seen this solution as an acceptable substitute for a Class D CTR.

The issues

An RMZ in Class G airspace simply enhances the "known traffic" environment. The hitherto unknown radar returns can now be identified and traffic information exchanged.

Air Traffic Control can only provide the service requested by the pilot. This could be a basic service for a VFR flight at one end of the scale, and a limited deconfliction service for IFR traffic at the other end of the scale. The only real improvements are the requirements for VFR traffic to establish two-way communication with ATC prior to entering the RMZ and to state their position, altitude and intentions. Traffic in Class G airspace is not required follow an ATC clearance.

Class D airspace:

- permits access for VFR traffic but does require it to follow an ATC clearance;
- requires two-way communication (same as RMZ);
- does not require IFR separation standards from other aircraft for VFR traffic;
- does require IFR separation standards between IFR traffic; and
- does offer traffic avoidance between VFR and IFR traffic.

Conclusion

The RMZ is a welcome interim solution but it was never proposed as solution in easyJet's safety case.

easyJet's safety case was based on the introduction of controlled airspace achievable by following the ACP process. A high level of radar surveillance was agreed between LSA, the CAA and easyJet as the acceptable risk mitigation in the medium term.

The RMZ does not offer the equivalent level of safety provided by controlled airspace (Class D) on which easyJet's safety case was based for long term operations.



London Southend Airport Radio Mandatory Zone 60 Day Report

Introduction

In November 2013, the CAA met with London Southend Airport (LSA), after the CAA had suggested that there could be options available to LSA to enhance the safety of the operation, in particular due to three recent airprox's and the increase in commercial passenger flights. The options suggested were the introduction of a Radio Mandatory Zone or a Transponder Mandatory Zone to address operational issues in the short term prior to the outcome of the CAS ACP. Whilst LSA could see the benefit of having a RMZ or TMZ there was also concerns that an introduction could affect the outcome of the CAS ACP. Therefore, LSA have always made it clear that whilst the introduction of the RMZ was positive, because of the nature of the airspace surrounding Southend, it was always seen as an interim measure with Class D airspace being the only appropriate class of airspace for the airport as detailed in the CAS ACP for the current traffic levels and expected growth.

London Southend Airport submitted an ACP for the establishment of CAS in June 2014

The temporary Southend Radio Mandatory Zone was introduced on 18th July 2014.

The CAA has asked LSA to carry out a review of the efficiency of the RMZ against the expected effects from its introduction. This review is based on the first 60 days of operation of the RMZ (18th July – 15th September 2014).

The RMZ review will also consider aspects of the CAS ACP in light of the ATC operational experience from the operation of the temporary Southend RMZ during the initial 60 days since its introduction.



London Southend Airport Radio Mandatory Zone 60 Day Report

LSA Statistics

The following Table shows latest statistics published by the CAA regarding the comparable size of UK Airports by numbers of passengers:

http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/80/airport_data/201407/Table_01_Size_of_UK_Airports.pdf

Airport	Annual Passengers Rolling Year (000's)	Ranking of airport size based on Pax. Nos.	Provision of CAS
Southampton	1,770	18	Yes
Southend	1,100	19	No
Cardiff	1,071	20	Yes
Prestwick	1,039	21	Yes
Exeter	755	22	No
Doncaster	697	23	Yes
Bournemouth	665	24	Yes
Inverness	602	25	No
Norwich	462	26	Yes
Sumburgh	286	30	Yes
Durham	146	34	Yes

As can be seen above, using this metric Southend is the 19th busiest airport in the UK and there are several airports with significantly less passenger numbers than Southend that have the protection of Class D airspace, specifically Cardiff-Wales, Prestwick, Doncaster-Sheffield, Bournemouth, Norwich, Sumburgh and Durham-Tees Valley. More tellingly perhaps, all of the airports handling more passengers than Southend have in place the protection of Class D (or higher category) controlled airspace. As the LSA business plan is to increase the amount of passengers to 2 million per annum in the immediate future with expected growth to 5 million per annum, the need for the protection of Class D airspace becomes more important and critical for traffic flow requirements.



London Southend Airport Radio Mandatory Zone 60 Day Report

LSA Traffic

For the month of July 2014, the airport movements total was 3,378 (this includes training missed approaches), 1,435 of these movements were either entering or leaving controlled airspace. There were also 3,282 overflights (i.e. traffic not departing or landing at LSA, but flying through the area of interest to Southend ATC) that Southend ATC provided with a service.

The monthly total that ATC provided a service to is 6,660, of which approximately 1,400 required a Deconfliction Service (DS).

These 6,660 movements mainly take place between the hours of 0630-2330 (a very low number of movements take place overnight). The vast majority of the overflights are concentrated within the period 0900-1800, when GA traffic tends to operate. This then leads to periods of much greater traffic concentration than the raw statistics alone suggest. There are peaks and troughs of activity throughout the day. The requirements of providing DS to multiple commercial flights (as often already happens with today's scheduled traffic, yet alone any predicted future growth at LSA) places a high workload on all parties involved: the pilots of overflying traffic; the ATC controllers at both Southend and Thames Radar, and the pilots of the aircraft operating to and from LSA.

Figures for August 2014 were at a similar level:

3,387 Airport movements, 1,429 of these movements were either entering or leaving controlled airspace and 3,307 overflights, giving a total of 6,694 to which Southend provided a service.

LSA Airspace Complexity

There are several factors that increase the complexity of providing ATC services in the vicinity of LSA.

- 1) The vertical extent of the airspace is severely limited to below 3,500ft by the overlying LTMA. Effectively this gives a narrow band of about 2,000ft that GA tends to fly within.
- 2) The airspace above LSA is fully utilised by NATS for other purposes, meaning that LSA commercial traffic is often unable to climb higher and has to travel some distance at lower altitudes where more GA aircraft are to be encountered. Aircraft releases are regularly altitude restricted to remain outside CAS requiring extended periods in Class G airspace. Similarly on arrival, it is often not possible to keep the aircraft inside CAS and aircraft must be descended below CAS prematurely again to altitudes where more GA is to be encountered.
- 3) The adjacent Danger Area complex at Shoeburyness, is typically active Monday – Friday between 0730 and 1730. Even when it is not active, pilots will often have already planned to avoid this airspace.
- 4) Smaller 'avoid' areas at Yantlet (D146), 2 large Gas venting stations adjacent to D146 and Restricted Area R156 at Bradwell Bay.




London Southend Airport Radio Mandatory Zone 60 Day Report

- 5) Proximity of large swathes of adjacent CAS around the London Airports that laterally funnels GA activity into the vicinity of LSA, as well as a large number of significant GA aerodromes located nearby.
- 6) Geographical location of the GA routes to and from the continent means a large proportion of such traffic passing in the vicinity of LSA.

RMZ Infringement Statistics

The LSA RMZ was established on 18 July 2014. RMZ infringements have been recorded and are displayed in the table below (It is not possible to record any aircraft that did not produce a radar contact inside the RMZ).

	Week 1 18-24 July	Week 2 25-31 July	Week 3 1-7 Aug	Week 4 8-14 Aug	Week 5 15-21 Aug	Week 6 22-28 Aug	Week 7 29- 4 Sep	Week 8 5 - 11 Sep	Week 9 12-19 Sep
TOTAL	19	16	7	7	19	17	23	20	20
PSR only	2	5	2	4	4	2	10	6	2
# 1177 (FIR)	1	4	0	2	1	0	1	2	0
Max/Day	5	4	2	3	7	7	7	8	3





London Southend Airport Radio Mandatory Zone 60 Day Report


The data above shows that a significant number of RMZ infringements are continuing to occur with high regularity, often at times when ATC workload is moderate to high. There is no one group that can be particularly singled out at this stage as contributing to a high proportion of the infringements.

When the RMZ was initially activated, LSA accepted that there would be infringements of the RMZ but these would decrease after the first couple of weeks (Airspace familiarity, Aviation forums, LSA publicity and where possible ATC/Pilot interface following infringements). As depicted by the 'RMZ infringement' graph above this did indeed happen although from week 5 there is a marked increase of infringements which continued for the following 5 weeks.

To date LSA ATC have opted not to report RMZ infringements via an MOR but instead, where possible, tried to trace aircraft and speak to the pilot and adjacent ATSU's directly so they can be informally educated.


The chart below shows numbers of infringements:

- 1) From aircraft working another ATSU,
- 2) From aircraft showing only a Primary Radar return,
- 3) From aircraft identified as belonging to a National Aviation body from either a squawk code or Mode-S identification.



London Southend Airport Radio Mandatory Zone 60 Day Report


A break-down of origin and or destination airfields of RMZ Infringers (where known or suspected) has been carried out and is shown in the chart below. The diagram does not include data where origin or destination information was not apparent or pertinent. The majority arise from the aerodromes nearest to LSA, and Southend ATC will continue to work with these airfields to increase awareness of the RMZ.



London Southend Airport Radio Mandatory Zone 60 Day Report

LARS Statistics

LSA wants to demonstrate a comparison of LARS statistics between 2013 and 2014, pre and post RMZ implementation. The chart below shows the numbers of aircraft that LSA has provided a LARS service to in the key 2 months of July and August 2013 and 2014.



It can be seen that the overall numbers of aircraft contacting Southend Radar is virtually static between the two years. The number of aircraft requesting and being provided with a radar based service is also steady. With the closure of the neighbouring LARS unit at Manston, it would have been expected that there would have been an increase in the number of overflights handled by LSA, this has not been observed in the figures, although some aircraft will be staying on the Southend LARS frequency for a longer period than they would have if Manston had still been operational.


LSA had already identified the requirement for a second radar frequency, prior to the RMZ, to better manage the increased and increasing commercial operations from the airport and to further enhance RT capacity. The figures above show that the additional ATC capacity has not led to a massive increase in the numbers of GA aircraft contacting the unit, indicating that users within the area are actually being well served by the ATC unit and the services that it offers.

The statistics demonstrate that the airspace in the vicinity of LSA has a traditionally very high volume of transiting aircraft. The statistics also clearly show that the introduction of the RMZ has not increased the amount of aircraft establishing contact with LSA whilst transiting in the vicinity of LSA.

The chart below shows the relationship between the number of overflights and traffic generated by LSA. Again it can be noted that the relative totals are pretty static. However, it can be seen that

London Southend Airport Radio Mandatory Zone 60 Day Report

there has been further significant growth in the level of Air Transport Movements as a proportion of the airport traffic since the original proposal for CAS was submitted to the CAA.



Benefits of the RMZ

The intention of an RMZ is to assist in providing a known traffic environment.

Restrictions of the RMZ

The Southend RMZ is still Class G and therefore carries the limitations that classification of airspace affords.

- Pilots do not have to accept a service
- Pilots are not required to accept coordination
- Pilots don't have to accept identification

Deconfliction service minima (applied to most CAT operating from LSA) is 3nm or 1000ft against coordinated traffic. This minima has to be applied even against VFR traffic receiving a Basic Service (BS). To achieve this, aircraft receiving a DS regularly experience an increase in track miles whilst laterally avoiding coordinated traffic. Aircraft accepting coordination often experience deviation, restriction or delay to their intended flight path. Whilst 3nm is the lateral deconfliction minima, often the aircraft that are in receipt of BS are not 'locked' on a heading, so the controller would



London Southend Airport Radio Mandatory Zone 60 Day Report

often add a buffer. In reality the lateral distance is often between 4-5nm depending on the circumstances. It is not uncommon for ATC to coordinate with multiple transit aircraft for every aircraft receiving a DS.

The act of coordination is inherently labour intensive to ATC and increases RT loading and frequency congestion.

The deconfliction requirements for aircraft in receipt of a DS, require Southend ATC to provide 5nm lateral separation against uncoordinated traffic. It is not possible in most cases to apply the vertical deconfliction requirements (3000ft) due to the vertical constraints of the airspace in the vicinity of LSA. When operating on runway 06, arrivals are frequently vectored additional track miles (in some cases up to 25 miles) to achieve 5nm deconfliction minima on unknown traffic. On some occasions the controller is unable to vector an aircraft for an approach due to un-coordinated traffic operating in the vicinity of the final approach track leaving the controller and pilot uncertain to the length of the delay.

Southend ATC request that arriving traffic remains inside CAS for as long as possible to avoid unknown aircraft. However, Thames Radar are not always able to facilitate this request requiring LSA arrivals to leave CAS. There is a potential scenario when there is unknown aircraft operating on the northern edge of the RMZ and unknown aircraft operating on the southern edge of the RMZ. In this scenario, unless the arriving aircraft is established on final approach prior to leaving CAS, it is not possible to achieve 5nm deconfliction minima.

Due to the dimensions of the RMZ (6 miles either side of the final approach track), there are occasions when it is not possible for departing aircraft to route direct, in accordance with the PDRs, until inside CAS due to unknown aircraft manoeuvring on the edge of the RMZ. The consequence of this is aircraft receiving additional track miles or a delay (this sometimes results in the departing aircraft being held on the ground).

As a direct comparison within Class D airspace, VFR transit aircraft would be able to continue on their intended route with potentially no deviation or restrictions applied, provided traffic information was passed on IFR aircraft. This clearly has a benefit to all parties concerned. Class D also benefits the GA/Sports and Recreation users by providing a known environment with enhanced safety.

LSA have LoAs in place with all airfields within the RMZ. Whilst this benefits the users of these airfields, the aircraft operating within these areas are unidentified and therefore deconfliction minima of 5 miles or 3000ft still applies. For example, Stoke Local Flying Zone (LFZ) means LSA are unable to turn aircraft on a PDR track or vector through the 'gate' from runway 24 if a contact is observed within the LFZ. With Class D a similar LoA would be in place but Southend ATC would be able to apply the rules of Class D airspace (ie traffic observed within the LFZ would be deemed outside CAS and therefore LSA ATC could transit aircraft at 2000ft to achieve 500ft above the LFZ).



London Southend Airport Radio Mandatory Zone 60 Day Report

RMZ non-radio requests

There have been four requests for non-radio operations within the RMZ. All of these requests were approved by LSA. One of these requests was for an operation for up to one hour to the NE of the airfield when RWY 24 was in use.

Stoke have not once requested to activate the 'Kingsnorth box'.

Additional advantages of Class D over the RMZ

The RMZ dimensions are wider and longer than the proposed CTR. The CTR/CTA configuration will offer pilots more airspace to transit closer to LSA without the requirement to establish two-way communication.

The CAS proposal is less restrictive to Stoke as they are under the CTA and offers them transit airspace to the west of their airfield without the need to contact Southend ATC.

The CAS is less restrictive to other aerodromes i.e. Stow Maries, Rochester, Thurrock and Laindon as again they will have more airspace in the vicinity of their locations where they do not need to contact Southend ATC.

Introduction of LSA CAS

LSA strongly believe the introduction of CAS should not be delayed beyond February 2015 because of an extended RMZ trial due to the following:

For the period October 2014 through February 2015, traffic levels drop sufficiently to allow Southend ATC to adequately prepare for the introduction of CAS including,

- ATC training,
- Risk assessment,
- Airspace familiarisation,
- Procedures review
- Airspace user education.

LSA want to introduce CAS prior to the start of Summer 2015 and be able to fine tune procedures prior to the introduction of LAMP1A scheduled for Winter 2015. LAMP1A will be another major change to the airspace in the vicinity of LSA and will have a significant impact on operations and workload requirements for LSA and NATS.



London Southend Airport Radio Mandatory Zone 60 Day Report

Future Airspace Strategy (FAS)

The CAA's FAS project focuses on Safety, Capacity and Environment.

Safety: *'The airspace system is driven by the need to continuously improve safety.'*

Due to the complex nature of the airspace in the vicinity of LSA, the high traffic density and the number of non-transponder equipped aircraft, a RMZ cannot be considered safer than Class D.

Capacity: *'It is likely that the pressure on the UK's airspace system will continue to grow in the long term with a changing profile of demand from different users groups leading to a tightening in the supply and demand balance for airspace. Even if there is only limited growth in air traffic demand, there are already 'hot spots' in the airspace today that could be improved by adopting concepts within the FAS thereby making the system safer, more efficient and address environmental concerns.'*

Due to the complex nature of the airspace in the vicinity of Southend, the high traffic density and the number of non-transponder equipped aircraft it has to be considered a hotspot area. RMZ's do not offer the most efficient use of airspace and therefore cannot offer increased capacity anywhere near to the extent of Class D airspace.

Environment: *'The proposals in FAS aim to enable aircraft to fly in more environmentally efficient ways while maximising capacity benefits and improving safety. The environmental impact of air travel both in terms of noise and air quality, and globally in terms of climate change, plays an important role in determining how the UK airspace system should develop.'*

Class G airspace (including RMZ's) cannot offer environmentally efficient use of airspace. LSA connectivity to the LTMA and CAT operations can only be efficient by having Class D airspace.

In the CAA FAS report 'Class G for the 21st century' it states:

- *'CAT operations in Class G airspace for larger passenger and cargo carrying aircraft is generally an "only if there is no other option" operation and for commercial passenger carrying flights a least preferred option'*
- *'Traffic density is a key factor with regard to risk in the Class G environment'*

LSA agree with the above statements. Following a trial of the RMZ, LSA believe that a RMZ may be suitable in another location but it is not compatible with the airspace environment, mix of traffic (different operating requirements and equipment levels – i.e. non transponder) and traffic density in the vicinity of LSA.



London Southend Airport Radio Mandatory Zone 60 Day Report

LAMP1A

LSA has been working closely with the LAMP team to ensure that the design of the Southend CAS is compatible with the LAMP1A programme. LSA is also currently progressing with projects for the SIDs and STARs in consultation with NATS to ensure most efficient use of the airspace to improve traffic flows and reduce flight distances. LSA has based the new STARs for LAMP1A terminating at the proposed hold at GEGMU (previously GUNFY). A RMZ would severely restrict standing and future operating procedures between Southend and NATS due to the unpredictable nature of traffic within Class G airspace.

LSA's response, input to and acceptance of, the LAMP consultation has been based upon the introduction of CAS at LSA. If CAS was not to be introduced, then LSA believe that continuing with existing procedures and airspace would not offer LSA the benefits that will be afforded to other airports. The introduction of the LAMP point merge system for London City would impose an unacceptable penalty on LSA traffic as there would be a NATS requirement for LSA traffic to be beneath point merge which would require LSA traffic, both departures and arrivals, to be outside CAS potentially for longer periods than the current operation.

Business Reputation

There is a negative perception for LSA as being perceived as a higher risk by airlines in comparison to other London Airports by not having controlled airspace as well as increased risk of delay / increased track miles due to regular re-routing / avoiding action being required.

Both primary carriers at LSA have identified commercial operations within Class G airspace as a serious concern within their respective risk registers



London Southend Airport Radio Mandatory Zone 60 Day Report

Summary

LSA had identified there was a requirement for Class D airspace in the vicinity of LSA in which LSA submitted an application for the establishment of CAS. Whilst waiting for the outcome of the ACP a RMZ was temporarily established.

LSA has wholeheartedly embraced the concept of the RMZ as a credible temporary alternative, but LSA believe the RMZ falls short of the operational requirement, business needs and the long term strategic intent of London Southend Airport to play an increasing role in providing meaningful and much needed London airport capacity.

LSA still strongly believe that Class D airspace is the only viable option for the airport and airspace users.

Signed:

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Pacey".

Jeff Pacey
Acting Manager ATS

Signed:

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Whawell".

Ben Whawell
CFO Stobart Group

23rd September 2014

On behalf of London Southend Airport



London Southend Airport Radio Mandatory Zone 60 Day Report

Appendices

1) RMZ infringement Log

A record of all infringements of the Southend RMZ

2) Class G incident log

Recorded incidents in which the ATC and pilot workload has increased due to individual occurrences within the vicinity of Southend. Note: It has not been possible to capture all occurrences due controller workload

3) CAS departures release delays

A record where aircraft releases from TCNE have been delayed by more than 5 minutes

4) Comments from based operators